



Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
DSpace Repository

Theses and Dissertations

1. Thesis and Dissertation Collection, all items

1967

The role of the Navy in the formulation of
United States foreign policy.

Kinnebrew, Thomas Richard.

American University

<http://hdl.handle.net/10945/26740>

Downloaded from NPS Archive: Calhoun



Calhoun is the Naval Postgraduate School's public access digital repository for research materials and institutional publications created by the NPS community. Calhoun is named for Professor of Mathematics Guy K. Calhoun, NPS's first appointed -- and published -- scholarly author.

Dudley Knox Library / Naval Postgraduate School
411 Dyer Road / 1 University Circle
Monterey, California USA 93943

<http://www.nps.edu/library>

NPS ARCHIVE
1967
KINNEBREW, T.

LIBRARY
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
MONTEREY, CALIF. 93940

ABSTRACT

Master's Thesis

The American University, Washington, D.C.

Title: The Role of the Navy in the Formulation of
United States Foreign Policy

Author: Thomas R. Kinnebrew

An examination of the means by which the Navy contributions are made during the formulation of foreign policy and of the actions taken by the Navy to prepare its officers for this effort. The organizational channels used receive primary attention. The under-graduate and post-graduate education programs of the Navy are discussed. A survey of the contents of the United States Naval Institute Proceedings evaluates the level of interest of the naval officer corps in foreign policy and national security policy.

THE ROLE OF THE NAVY IN THE FORMULATION OF
UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

By

Thomas Richard Kinnebrew
"

Submitted to the
Faculty of the School of International Service
of The American University
In Partial Fulfillment of
The Requirements for the Degree
of
MASTER OF ARTS

Signatures of Committee:

Chairman: _____

Date: _____

Dean of the School

Date: _____

1 - ARCHIVE

~~There is 466~~

967

INNEBREW, T.

LIBRARY
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
MONTEREY, CALIF. 93940

Copyright by
Thomas Richard Kinnebrew
1967

PREFACE

Because the author of this paper is a naval officer on active duty, it may be worthwhile to point out--and to emphasize, if need be--that the information, opinions, findings, and conclusions of this work are the author's own except where specifically attributed to another. The work does not necessarily represent the position of the Navy Department or of any of the officers or officials with whom it was discussed during its preparation. It is the product of the author and he alone is responsible for its content.

The long list of individuals to whom the author is indebted for assistance is headed by Professor Durward V. Sandifer of the American University and the late Dean Charles C. Lerche, also of the American University. Their teaching inspired his initial interest in this subject; their guidance assisted materially in the development of the final product.

A heartfelt vote of thanks is also due the author's shipmates in U.S.S. COURTNEY (DE-1021), who provided continuing and meaningful encouragement and support during the drafting and editing phases of the work.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER	PAGE
I. INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEM	1
II. HISTORICAL ROLE OF THE NAVY THROUGH WORLD WAR II. .	11
The Early Years	11
Expansionism and a Growing Navy	12
World War I	16
Post-War Disarmament Conferences.	17
Army and Navy Relationship.	22
The Franklin D. Roosevelt Years	22
Planning for Post-War Years	33
Summary	35
III. POST-WAR ORGANIZATION AND REORGANIZATION OF THE	
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE	36
The First Moves toward Reorganization	36
The National Security Act of 1947	40
The 1949 Amendments	44
The Korean War Period	47
The Reorganization Act of 1953.	49
The Chairman and the Chiefs	52
The 1953 Reorganization	56
The Current Status.	60
Summary	66

CHAPTER	PAGE
IV. THE NAVY'S RECOGNITION OF ITS ROLE.	69
Methodology	70
Analysis.	77
1899-1901	77
1909-1911	79
1919-1921	80
1929-1931	81
1939-1941	82
1949-1951	82
1959-1961	84
Conclusions	85
V. THE NAVY'S PREPARATION FOR ITS ROLE	87
Undergraduate Education	89
Post-Graduate Education	93
Designation of Officers	120
Designation of Duty Assignments	123
Summary	124
VI. PRESENT NAVY PARTICIPATION IN POLICY MAKING	126
Examples of Navy Participation.	126
The Naval Officers Involved	130
The Secretary of Defense.	132
The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.	133

CHAPTER	PAGE
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff	136
The Joint Staff	136
The Joint Chiefs of Staff	140
The Chief of Naval Operations	141
Unified and International Commanders.	143
Interagency Activities and Opinion Molding. . . .	146
Summary	150
VII. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS.	151
BIBLIOGRAPHY.	162
APPENDIX.	173

LIST OF TABLES

TABLE	PAGE
I. The Educational Level of U.S. Naval Officers in International Relations and Political Science. . .	121
II. Analysis of Content of All Articles in <u>United</u> <u>States Institute Proceedings</u>	174
III. Analysis of Content of Lead Articles in <u>United</u> <u>States Institute Proceedings</u>	176
IV. Analysis of Subject of Books Reviewed in <u>United</u> <u>States Institute Proceedings</u>	178

LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURE	PAGE
1. Percent of All Articles Published in the <u>U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings</u> on National Security Policy and Foreign Policy	175
2. Percent of Lead Articles Published in the <u>U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings</u> on National Security Policy and Foreign Policy	177
3. Percent of Book Reviews Published in the <u>U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings</u> on National Security Policy and Foreign Policy	179

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEM

With the advent of nuclear weapons and intercontinental delivery systems, the nature of warfare changed. This change was compounded by the activity at the other end of the spectrum of conflict, the wars by proxy waged by the communists and called "wars of national liberation." These changes came concomitantly with the emergence of the United States as a super-power in world affairs. The task of directing its efforts in the right direction and by the right methods was particularly difficult for the United States because this was the nation's first full-fledged participation in international affairs in time of peace.

Another major change was the base upon which United States foreign policy was formulated. In earlier years national security was the base upon which foreign policy was built; presently, national security is the goal toward which foreign policy must be directed.

At the same time, approximately, as the changes discussed above--and partly in response thereto--there were revolutionary changes wrought in the organizational structure of the United States military forces. As a result of all these changes, military advice and information are much more pertinent in the formulation of foreign policy than

was the case in the past. Furthermore, the channels through which military advice is sought and furnished have changed remarkably.

Universal agreement on the role the military should play in the formulation of foreign policy does not exist. On the one hand, the nation is warned by its President to be alert for too much military influence. In his farewell address President Eisenhower said:

In the councils of government, we must guard against the unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. . . . Only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial and military machinery of defense with our peaceful methods and goals, so that security and liberty may prosper together.

On the other hand, when addressing the graduating class at the United States Naval Academy in June, 1961, President Kennedy urged the midshipmen to be prepared to go beyond the confines of purely military considerations in decision making. He said:

You must know everything you can about military power and you must also understand the limits of military power. You must understand that few of the important problems of our time have, in the final analysis, been finally solved by military power. When I say that officers of today must go far beyond the official curriculum, I say it not because I do not believe in the traditional relationship between the civilian and the military, but you must be more than the servants of national policy. You must be prepared to play a constructive role in the development of national policy, a policy which protects our interests and our security and the peace of the world.

Comparison of these two quotations reveals that they

are not contradictory--although at first reading they may appear to be. Each of the Presidents was addressing the same problem; each no doubt believed the same facts to exist; each sought approximately the same contribution from military officers in the field of policy formulation. The fact that the quotations appear contradictory is indicative of much of the problem of investigating this field. The role of the military in policy-making has not yet been clearly defined, although it is more fully done now than at any previous time. Because no one can cite chapter and verse regarding the contributions expected and the limitations placed on the military in policy-making, great differences of opinion have arisen as to what they should be.

Some of the problems incident to finding the proper role for the military have been with us a long time. Others are new.

Among the older problems still facing the nation is the place of the military in a liberal state. Samuel P. Huntington points out that the ideal liberal state does not have a security function, it is presumed to exist in vacuo. "The assumption of a state in a vacuum was particularly relevant to American liberalism because for almost a century American reality approximated the liberal image. The applicability of the liberal assumption to the United States settled it all the more firmly in the American mind and

created problems all the more difficult to solve when the vacuum began to break down."¹ And now, the vacuum has been replaced by the pressure of international involvement and conflict, and still the problem is not totally solved.

Civilian control of the military is an indispensable element of the American process of government. Considerable concern has been expressed, increasingly so in recent years, that military advisers are loosening the shackles of civilian control and marching off on their own paths in developing policy. Morris Janowitz notes, "The military profession is criticized as carrying too much weight and influence in the formulation of foreign policy, especially by over-emphasizing the function of violence. As compared with that of Great Britain, our military force seems much too active and outspoken as a legislative pressure group and as a 'public relations' force."² He concludes, however, that civilian control of the military is intact and is acceptable to the military, calling any imbalance in military contributions to politico-military affairs "the result of default

¹Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and The State (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957), p. 149.

²Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1960), p. 14.

by civilian political leadership."³

Hanson Baldwin, a graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, might be expected to be favorably disposed to the military. He is, but he recognizes the necessity for constraints, "The military must be honored but not extolled, allowed to influence but not to propagandize, have their place in government but a place strictly circumscribed."⁴

In an excellent work on this subject, The Role of the Military in American Foreign Policy, the problem is described quite well, "All in all, there can be little doubt but that the role of the American Military Establishment in the formulation and execution of national policy (as well as its wider impact on the society) represents an important contemporary political and social problem. It is also essentially a new problem, in part because traditional American values and institutions in the field of civil-military relations have never before been so severely challenged."⁵

The same authors have a hopeful outlook for solving the problem. Addressing three basic aspects of the situation,

³Ibid., p. viii.

⁴Hanson Baldwin, "The Military Move In," Harper's Magazine, 195:1171, December, 1947, p. 489.

⁵Burton M. Sapin and Richard C. Snyder, The Role of the Military in American Foreign Policy (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1954), p. 2.

they conclude that "vigorous and imaginative civilian leadership, together with greater civilian and military self-consciousness about the nature and limits of the foreign policy making role of the military establishment and its professional officer personnel, should aid in the achievement of these fundamental goals: first, effective as well as formal civilian control of the major foreign policies and programs of the U.S.; second, more effective and economic use of the skills and resources of the military establishment in foreign policy making; and third, safe-guarding the career-servant, non-partisan role of the military officer in the American government."⁶

E.S. Corwin has said, "The Constitution is an invitation to struggle for the privilege of directing American foreign policy."⁷ This statement highlights the fact that foreign policy is often made by those who aggressively set forth and advance their convictions. When this situation is considered along with the fact that "it is not possible to draw a strict line between the development and formulation of policies on the one hand and their execution and imple-

⁶Ibid., p. 67.

⁷E.S. Corwin, The President: Office and Powers, 1787-1948 (New York: NYU Press, 1948), p. 208.

mentation on the other,"⁸ one can understand that not only is military advice needed in developing policy but military leaders feel an obligation to make it available. From that point on, the distinction between making information and advice available and making policy itself is a question of individual interpretation. This accounts in large measure for the concern that is often expressed from both points of view about military participation in policy making. Sometimes it is alleged that the military implications are not sufficiently considered in policy making. More often, it is stated that military men have too much influence in the formulation of policy.

There is little disagreement expressed that there must be some military contribution to policy making. Alfred Vagts quotes Senator Green as saying, "It is really nonsense to discuss considering military matters apart from the diplomatic because the diplomatic fixes the objective."⁹ It is equally nonsensical to consider diplomatic matters without considering the existence or lack of military power required to support the national policy and accomplish its objectives.

Americans have not always successfully amalgamated

⁸Sapin and Snyder, op. cit., p. 40.

⁹Alfred Vagts, Defense and Diplomacy (New York: King's Crown Press, 1956), p. 117.

military and diplomatic policies, strategies, and objectives. We could accept as our own the failure laid at the feet of Hitler's Germany by one of his military leaders, General Kleist, "Our mistake was to think that a military success would solve political problems. Indeed, under the Nazis we tended to reverse Clausewitz's dictum and to regard peace as a continuation of war."¹⁰

Although the United States did not make the most, diplomatically, of the power it held during and following World War II, it now seems to have become aware more than ever of the necessity for subordinating military objectives to longer range political ones. Secretary of Defense James Forrestal said, "The great mistakes were made during the war because of American failure to realize that military and political action had to go hand in hand. . . . Both the British and the Russians realize this fact."¹¹

The nature of the Cold War has contributed to increasing the liaison and cooperation required between military men and statesmen. Another influence has been the changing weaponry of the major powers. Janowitz points out, "Because the more advanced technology of war lies at the

¹⁰B.H. Liddell Hart, The German Generals Talk (New York: Berkley Publishing Corp., 1958), p. 162.

¹¹Walter Millis (ed.), The Forrestal Diaries (New York: The Viking Press, 1951), p. 496.

source of the increased political power of the military elite, all major industrialized powers are experiencing this trend toward great political influence by military leaders."¹²

It can be seen, therefore, that military considerations are important in the whole spectrum of the nation's foreign policy objectives, ranging from uncommitted nations' needs to major powers' confrontations. What is not clear is the manner in which these military considerations should be introduced into the policy-making machinery. Carrying the point a step further, what is the role of one part of "the military" in this process? Specifically, what is the role of one service, the Navy, in developing foreign policy? As a look at the bibliography makes apparent, a substantial amount of study has been directed toward the subject of overall military participation in policy making. To the best of the author's knowledge, no study has been focused on the role of one service. This study, then, will examine the role of the Navy in the development of foreign policy. A brief treatment of the Navy's historical contributions will be given, followed by a more detailed examination of the

¹²Morris Janowitz, "Working Paper on The Professional Soldier and Political Power" (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Bureau of Government, Institute of Public Administration, University of Michigan, 1953), p. 15. (Mimeographed.)

organization through which much of the Navy's present contribution is funneled--the Department of Defense. This study will also address the awareness and interest of the officer corps in the problem and the preparations of the Navy to train its officers to make a meaningful contribution to policy making.

The aim of this study is to determine what the Navy does in formulating foreign policy and how the Navy prepares itself to do this. It is imperative for the Navy and for the nation that this preparation be adequate since an understanding of the objective is essential to selecting a proper course of action for achieving that objective.

Morris Janowitz introduced The Professional Soldier by saying, "The military faces a crisis as a profession: How can it organize itself to meet its multiple functions of strategic deterrence, limited warfare, and enlarged politico-military responsibility?"¹³ This study will examine the way in which the Navy is meeting a part of this crisis.

¹³Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, p. vii.

CHAPTER II

HISTORICAL ROLE OF THE NAVY THROUGH WORLD WAR II

An examination of the role of the Navy in making foreign policy in earlier years should provide a better appreciation and understanding of the Navy's present role. Accordingly, this chapter considers the part played by officers of the Navy from the founding of the nation until the end of World War II.

I. THE EARLY YEARS

In the first century of the nation's life, there were frequent requirements for naval officers to engage in policy-making. Such action usually took place on the scene and at the time a policy decision was required. Many times there were no other accredited representatives of the United States present, and the senior naval officer was forced to decide on a course of action and carry it out. With a knowledge of the broad policies of the government, this was usually a matter of selecting one of the several available options that fell within the broad parameters of the accepted policy--as the officer at the scene understood the policy.

In this way, by the end of the War of 1812, officers of the United States Navy had conducted negotiations with

representatives of France, Morocco, and Algiers.¹ These were substantive negotiations, addressing subjects of considerable import. Minor negotiations with other nations had also been conducted by naval officers.

In the nineteenth century, naval officers concluded treaties with Hawaii, Japan, Korea, and Samoa. Activities such as these resulted in there being a number of navy planners who had worked on issues in which the interests of the sailor and the diplomat tended to converge.² The number of naval officers so trained has varied in the intervening years, but the hard core of ability in this field has never been totally lost.

II. EXPANSIONISM AND A GROWING NAVY

In the second half of the nineteenth century, and especially following the War Between The States, the place of the Navy in the national structure began to change. This change brought with it an alteration of the role of the service in foreign policy matters.

The inconclusive battle at Hampton Roads, Virginia, in 1862 between the U.S.S. MONITOR and the C.S.S. VIRGINIA

¹John W. Masland and Laurence I. Radway, Soldiers and Scholars (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 5.

²Ibid.

(ex-MERRIMAC) sounded the death knell for wooden warships of the line. The transition to steel hulls had begun, and the shift from wooden to steel hulls had far-ranging ramifications. Not the least of these in the United States was the fact that American industry had gained a much greater interest in the market for its product provided by the Navy.³ Industry then emerged as an active lobbyist and propagandist for American naval expansion.⁴

This condition grew along with the first rumblings of overseas expansionism. Reinforcing each other, they combined to create a favorable climate for naval growth and for greater influence by the Navy on policy. This view was reflected by the report of the Secretary of the Navy, Richard W. Thompson, in 1877: "Without foreign commerce we must sink into inferiority; and without a Navy amply sufficient for this purpose, all the profits of our surplus productions will be transferred from the coffers of our own to those of foreign governments."⁵

This mood was by no means uniform throughout the nation, and it met with open hostility in many areas. Num-

³Arthur A. Ekirch, Jr., The Civilian and the Military (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956), p. 127.

⁴Ibid., p. 126.

⁵Ibid.

bers of Congressmen believed a large navy to be a useless luxury and a provocation to war. Such critics pointed out that the nation had no colonies to protect and that the national economy could be largely supplied and utilized by the people of the United States without recourse to foreign involvement in trade or otherwise.⁶

The national policy was no doubt greatly affected by the writings of Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan of the U.S. Navy. Although history remembers Mahan as more theorist than activist, he took a vigorous role in circulating his theories and beliefs. Captain Mahan was a member of the popular school of thought that urged a policy of expansionism. A sizeable and influential number of American statesmen, including Henry Cabot Lodge and Theodore Roosevelt, were supporters of this doctrine.⁷

There can be little doubt that the existence of a capable navy and the prevalence of expansionistic feeling in the nation contributed to American involvement in the war with Spain in the closing years of the century.

The post-war atmosphere of victory and the mood of expansionism affected the United States remarkably---perhaps more so than it did other nations. It is, therefore, not surprising to find the American position at the Hague Con-

⁶Ibid., p. 126

⁷Ibid., p. 127.

ference in 1898 dominated by a nationalistic, military point of view. Captain Mahan, United States Navy, was a member of the United States delegation. He made clear that the United States would refuse to consider the question of naval disarmament and did not intend to reduce its military resources.⁸

Another indication of increasing national interest in the Navy was the birth of the United States Navy League in 1903. This organization has been described as the Navy's strong right arm in the civilian community. It has also been referred to as a propaganda organization.⁹ The Navy League, which is still today a large, effective body, was modeled after similar groups already existing in Europe. It served to unite groups interested in encouraging legislation for a strong navy and became a powerful lobbyist for naval forces.

Criticism has been leveled against the military leaders of the nation for their lack of political expertise and their shortcomings in dealing with foreign problems from the turn of the century until the First World War. It should be noted that this lack of knowledge and foresight, which probably existed as claimed, was not a peculiarly military inability but was in tune with the civilian thinking of the times. Morris Janowitz says, "It is misleading to claim

⁸Ibid., p. 137.

⁹Ibid., p. 148.

that the source of the difficulty was an un-political attitude on the part of the military; it is more accurate to point out that their political horizons were limited, and reflected the interests of civilian society."¹⁰

III. WORLD WAR I

The outbreak of war in Europe in 1914 sent shock waves across the Atlantic that struck at all levels of the American electorate. Again, as in the days of George Washington, foreign policy became a principal and continuing concern of the people and the government. This condition was demonstrated in the election campaign of 1916. In the introduction to Alexander DeConde's book, Paul H. Clyde says, "When in 1916 Americans re-elected a President because 'He kept us out of war!' they subscribed, doubtless without so intending, to a diplomatic revolution without precedent in the history of democratic government."¹¹ Foreign policy had become a subject of widespread importance and interest to Americans of all walks of life.

Concurrently with the presidential campaign of 1916,

¹⁰Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1960), p. 287.

¹¹Arthur DeConde (ed.), Isolation and Security (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1957), p. vii.

Congress engaged in prolonged and bitter debate on the administration's five-year naval building program. Although it was an election year, this subject would have provoked strong feelings on its own merit at any time. It was a program without precedent, compressing a five year ship-building program into three years. Some Congressmen fought the bill, protesting that it provided for a navy far beyond the legitimate defense needs of the nation. In fact, the program was designed to give the United States a navy second only to Great Britain's, which at that time served as the yardstick by which international naval might was measured. The Navy League and business interests were charged by some Congressmen with exerting strong pressure for passage of the bill. Despite the strength of the opposition, the building program became law with the passage of the Naval Act of August 29, 1916.

IV. POST-WAR DISARMAMENT CONFERENCES

After the Armistice, memories of the horrors of the First World War gave renewed impetus to the movement for disarmament. (This term is used here as it was used at the time. In present terminology, the movement would be called arms control rather than disarmament.) The disarmament movement had greater applicability to the navy of the 1920s than to the army. The United States Army that had fought in

World War I was being demobilized, and proposals for universal military training had been defeated. America's stake in the Washington Conference of 1922 was centered on its naval forces.¹²

The Washington Conference, which was initiated by the United States, was the legitimate offspring of the earlier Hague Conference. Anti-militarism was the touchstone of policy at this conference with the U.S. Secretary of State attempting to reconcile an active foreign policy with a minimal military force. At this time the Navy had a General Board, which was comprised of senior admirals who studied and made recommendations regarding policy. The recommendations of the General Board were not followed at the Washington Conference of 1922. The admirals advised against discussing the islands in the Pacific and completely opposed any restrictions on fortifications. Nevertheless, Secretary Hughes agreed to maintain the status quo of the island fortifications. His position, apparently, was based on information from senators that funds for fortifications would not be appropriated anyway.¹³

The Navy's policy-makers were opposed to the results

¹²Ibid., p. 203.

¹³J. Chalmers Vinson, "Military Force and American Policy, 1919-1939," Isolation and Security (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1957), p. 60.

of the Washington Conference in many respects, even though it did provide for naval parity with Great Britain in heavy warships. To counter the trend toward a de-emphasis of the importance of naval power to the nation, the Navy Department launched an intensive campaign in the spring of 1922 to gain Congressional support for an expanded personnel program. Support for the Navy's position came from numerous business and patriotic organizations including the National Association of Manufacturers, the National Chamber of Commerce, the National Security League, the American Legion, and the Navy League. One of the highlights of this campaign was the annual celebration of Navy Day, which began in 1922.¹⁴

Proponents of disarmament counterattacked. The Navy's resistance to the Washington Conference results were strongly criticized, and increased stature to this opposition was given by Calvin Coolidge when he became President. Recognizing continued popular interest in disarmament and noting Congressional attacks on naval appropriations, President Coolidge repeatedly attacked the policy of "competitive armaments."¹⁵

Navy professionals from all nations took a greater part in the Geneva Conference of 1927 than they had in Washington in 1922. The basic ratio for ship strengths had been

¹⁴Ekirch, op. cit., p. 209-210.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 211.

decided at the latter; at Geneva, efforts were aimed at providing for a more nearly just distribution. Since no nation's concept of justice in this area agreed with any other nation's, the conference produced no tangible results. It is noteworthy that this conference, too, was held at American instigation.

Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson headed the American delegation to the London Naval Conference of 1930. France and Italy declined to attend this conference, leaving Great Britain, Japan, and the United States as participants. The Americans made little progress at this conference, losing ground to the British in the field of cruiser strength and losing ground to the Japanese in overall ratio (changed from 5-5-3 to 10-10-7 for Great Britain, the United States, and Japan, respectively) and in submarine strengths. Naval officers in the United States opposed the results of the conference, but despite widespread criticism the Hoover administration accepted the treaty.

The bitter debates that took place within the administration on this treaty have not been made public. The disparate views, and the vehemence with which they were expressed in executive sessions, have not been made known. However, the fact that the Navy was vigorously opposing the provisions of the treaty can be inferred from the actions of the Secretary of State. In a radio address on June 12, 1930,

Secretary Stimson attacked his naval officer opponents, saying, "They are handicapped by a kind of training which tends to make men think of war as the only possible defense against war."¹⁶

The final conference in this series of naval disarmament conferences took place in London in 1935-1936. When Japanese demands for full parity were opposed by the United States, Japan withdrew from the conference. This effectively ended the effort of the conference although France, Great Britain, and the United States signed a treaty on March 25, 1936. The treaty had so many "escalator clauses" as to be virtually meaningless. American ship-building, which had been re-born in 1934 under the leadership of President

¹⁶Quoted by Ekirch, op. cit., p. 216. This statement indicates Mr. Stimson's skepticism and, usually, disagreement with the opinions of naval officers. An insight into his beliefs is offered by the following evaluation attributed to him by McGeorge Bundy during the postwar Army-Navy disputes: "Some of the Army-Navy troubles, in Stimson's view, grew mainly from the peculiar psychology of the Navy Department, which frequently seemed to retire from the realm of logic into a dim religious world in which Neptune was God, Mahan was his prophet, and the United States Navy the only true Church. The high priests of this Church were a group of men to whom Stimson always referred as 'the Admirals.' These gentlemen were to him both anonymous and continuous; he had met them in 1930 in discussions of the London Naval Treaty; in 1940 and afterwards he found them still active and still uncontrolled by either their Secretary or the President." From Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service In Peace and War (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1948), p. 506.

Roosevelt and Congressman Carl Vinson, continued at an accelerating pace from this time until the end of World War II.

V. ARMY AND NAVY RELATIONSHIP

During the years of the nineteen-twenties and nineteen-thirties, the Army and Navy had continued their separate existences. There was virtually no inter-service rivalry other than in athletics. This situation is the more readily understood with the recognition of the fact that separate Appropriations Sub-committees for each service existed in the Congress, and, therefore, the size of one service's budget was not necessarily related to the other's. The annual budget battle was not a zero sum game at that time.

Strategic planning was nevertheless beginning to acquire a joint flavor in these two decades as the services co-operated in this field through the Joint Board. This organization was not empowered to force a dissenter to conform, however, so that its purpose was primarily advisory.¹⁷

VI. THE FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT YEARS

Navy and Army officers moved closer to the forefront

¹⁷Samuel P. Huntington, "Interservice Competition and the Political Roles of the Armed Services," American Political Science Review, 50:40, March, 1961.

in national policy-making with the inauguration of President Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1933. Roosevelt has been accused, and not without basis, of neglecting his cabinet officers and placing inordinate reliance on the Chiefs of the military services. No President before him had maintained such intimate and constant consultation with his military leaders.¹⁸ It was fortunate for the President and the nation that the military chiefs proved to be well equipped for this responsibility. In part this ability must be attributed to the fact that, as Samuel P. Huntington says, "The progressive involvement of the United States in international politics by the 1930s caused the world of American foreign relations to approximate the image which the military had always painted of it."¹⁹

It must not be inferred that President Roosevelt unfailingly followed the advice of his military leaders, however. In September, 1937, after war had been renewed in China, Secretary of the Navy Claude Swenson urged that the nation declare war. Roosevelt told his cabinet that he was "a pacifist" and delayed the conflict with Japan--while the

¹⁸ Alfred Vagts, Defense and Diplomacy (New York: King's Crown Press, 1956), p. 518.

¹⁹ Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and The State (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University, 1957), p. 306.

U.S. shipyards continued building.²⁰

Another instance of FDR's restraint came in December, 1937, following the sinking of the U.S.S. PANAY by Japanese warplanes. The other President Roosevelt might have heeded the recommendations of his advisors and declared war, but FDR did not take any provocative action despite the support given by his adviser Norman H. Davis and Assistant Secretary of State Walton Moore to Admiral Leahy's proposal to prepare the fleet for action at sea.²¹

Admiral William Leahy was serving as the Chief of Naval Operations at that time; later, he served as military adviser to Roosevelt during World War II. The actions of Admiral Leahy demonstrate the influence of the Navy in policy-making during this period. In 1937, after FDR's famous quarantine speech at Chicago, Admiral Leahy testified before the House Committee on Naval Affairs, appearing as the spokesman for the President. Leahy stated, "The political conditions in the world at this moment, both in Europe and in the Far East, are far more threatening than at any time since 1918, and no improvement is in sight. The major conflict in China has resulted in many grave incidents

²⁰William L. Neumann, "Ambiguity and Ambivalence in Ideas of National Interest in Asia," Isolation and Security (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1957), p. 151.

²¹Ibid.

involving the sovereign rights and interests of the United States and other third powers. The civil war in Spain continues unabated and the threat of a general European conflict is ever present."²²

Such a statement showed a keen awareness of the international political situation. It must be assumed that the Admiral's opinions and advice carried weight in the councils of policy makers despite his rejoinder to questioning by a member of the committee. When asked to discuss the relation between the quarantine speech and the pending bill for greater naval construction, Admiral Leahy replied that the Navy Department had nothing to do with policy and that he did not know what future policy might be.²³

Congressional debate on the naval construction bill of 1938 proved to be a forum for discussing foreign policy. Some Congressmen feared that the nation was inexorably moving toward war and used the debate to give voice to their fears. Congressman Maverick of Texas declared on the floor of the House that the admirals of the Navy were directing the nation's foreign policy. Senator Johnson of Colorado insisted that the Senate understand "we are not dealing

²²Charles A. Beard, American Foreign Policy in the Making (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1946), p. 214-215.

²³Ibid.

with navies, we are dealing with American foreign policy."

Senator Walsh stated his understanding that the Navy had taken the initiative in advancing the legislation and that Admiral Leahy himself had approached the President on the subject.²⁴ Passages such as these illustrate the influence, real or imagined, of the senior officers of the Navy on the nation's foreign policy of the nineteen-thirties.

By executive order the President froze all Japanese assets in the United States in July, 1941. This action was taken despite opposition by the military leaders. Admiral Stark and General Marshall opposed the issuance of the order but the advice of Secretaries Morgenthau and Stimson prevailed. Interestingly, ten days before the order was issued the Army Staff's War Plans Division warned that an embargo would possibly lead to an early war in the Pacific.²⁵

In the months preceding the American entry into World War II, a War Council existed and met with President Roosevelt. Membership of the Council consisted of the President, Secretary of State Hull, Secretary of War Stimson, Secretary of the Navy Knox, the U.S. Army Chief of Staff, and the

²⁴U.S. Congress, Congressional Record, 75th Congress, 3rd Session (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1938), p. 776, 902-903, 1244-1245, 3274, 3330, 5519, 5525, 5707, 6117, 5890-5891, 5854.

²⁵Neumann, op. cit., p. 154-155.

Chief of Naval Operations. The group met weekly in the President's oval office, acting as a clearing house and forum for ideas and for addressing the problems then confronting the nation. After the war began, the President discontinued his meetings with this group. As will be discussed shortly, the President's wartime advice came predominantly from the military leaders.²⁶

The demands of World War II could not be met by decision makers operating in the pre-war organizational structure. The military answer to this problem was the creation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The first meeting of this body took place on February 9, 1942, and was attended by General Marshall of the Army, Admiral King of the Navy, and General Arnold of the Army Air Corps.²⁷

A statutory basis for the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not exist until 1947 nor did a charter of responsibility. Admiral Leahy has noted, "I have heard that in some file there is a chit or memorandum from Roosevelt, setting up

²⁶ Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1948) Volume II, p. 1079. also Stimson and Bundy, op. cit., p. 563.

²⁷ Paul Y. Hammond, Organizing For Defense--The American Military Establishment in the Twentieth Century (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1961), p. 166.

the JCS, but I never saw it."²⁸

The lack of boundaries on the role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff provided an opportunity for their exercising considerable influence on policy in many areas. The JCS soon became not only the principal agency for Army-Navy-Air Corps coordination but also a major contributor to policy decisions in other areas. Admiral Leahy points out, "The absence of any fixed charter of responsibility allowed great flexibility in the JCS organization and enabled us to extend its activities to meet the changing requirements of the war. The JCS was an instrument of the Commander-in-Chief and was responsible to him."²⁹

The emergence of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a primary policy-making body did not go unopposed by the civilian leaders within the administration. On two occasions Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox threatened to resign because he was not privy to discussions between the President and the Chief of Naval Operations.³⁰ Secretary of War Stimson encountered similar problems in his dealings with the Presi-

²⁸William D. Leahy, I Was There (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1950), p. 102.

²⁹Ibid.

³⁰Paul Y. Hammond, "Decision-Making in Defense: The Role of Organization. Effects of Structure on Policy," Public Administration Review, 18:175, Summer, 1953.

dent, Stimson says, "(W)hen Mr. Roosevelt learned to like the JCS, in 1942, he allowed himself to dispense with any general meetings on war policy."³¹

The influence of the Secretary of State was equally eroded. In his Memoirs, Cordell Hull writes, "After Pearl Harbor I did not sit in on meetings concerned with military matters. This was because the President did not invite me to such meetings. I raised the question with him several times. It seemed manifest to me that, in numerous instances, the Secretary of State should sit in on the President's war councils, particularly on those of a combined military and diplomatic nature, for it was obvious that scarcely any large-scale military operations could be undertaken that would not have diplomatic aspects."³²

If Mr. Hull's contention is granted that large scale military operations had diplomatic aspects--and, indeed, it seems beyond dispute--then it must be assumed that the diplomatic aspects were addressed by the President and his close advisers only. The bulk of these close advisers were the military leaders.

The degree to which the Secretary of State was bypassed in policy is clearly evident in his almost plaintive statement, "Mr. Roosevelt had not communicated to me the

³¹Stimson, loc. cit.

³²Hull, op. cit., p. 1109.

decisions reached at Casablanca. As I have said before, he did not include me in the conferences he held then and later with Churchill, Stalin, and Chiang Kai-shek on the ground that they were military discussions and did not concern the State Department. We had asked Admiral Leahy for a copy of the Casablanca agreement but had been told that no copy was available for us."³³

Secretary of War Stimson recognized the problem of the State Department, "The military interest could not of itself be wholly determinant; it was not proper that such questions should be decided by the JCS, as the members of that body well understood."³⁴

Despite the opposition of the Presidential advisers to his primary reliance on the military leaders, there is no evidence to indicate that President Roosevelt significantly deviated from this procedure. Additionally, the Joint Chiefs of Staff exerted great influence through their work with the British service chiefs. The United States Joint Chiefs of Staff and the military leaders of Great Britain formed the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The organization came into being in Washington in early 1942 and was soon a fully developed instrument for coordinating land, sea, and air operations in the war. Secretary of War Stimson says that the Combined

³³Ibid., p. 1367.

³⁴Stimson, op. cit., p. 561.

Chiefs of Staff "gradually developed an authority and influence exceeded only by the decisive meetings between the President and the Prime Minister."³⁵

The Joint Chiefs of Staff were not provided with staff support by statutory authority. By the end of 1942, however, the JCS had created the Joint Strategic Survey Commission. This body had members from each of the services, and these members functioned primarily as representatives of their parent services. The concept of a joint or general staff, while well understood in the United States, had not yet been accepted.³⁶

Admiral William D. Leahy, United States Navy, was perhaps the most influential of all the military leaders involved in policy making. His position has been described in various ways. Leahy himself said that he was the President's Chief of Staff and viewed his most important function as maintaining continuing liaison between the President and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.³⁷ He formed the link between the White House and the Pentagon, keeping the JCS apprised of the President's thinking and informing the President of the views of the JCS. In this way, he performed a function later

³⁵Ibid., p. 413.

³⁶Hammond, Organizing For Defense, p. 186.

³⁷Leahy, op. cit., p. 101.

to be handled by the Chairman of the JCS and, still later, by the Secretary of Defense.

Admiral Leahy's duties were somewhat broader than liaison, however. He attended conferences with the President and sat in on political sessions as well as military ones. He says, "My presence was required at all of the purely military meetings of these war councils. In addition, Presidents Roosevelt and Truman both asked me to attend many of the political sessions where only Stalin, Churchill, and Roosevelt (Truman at Potsdam) and a few of their top advisers sat around the conference table."³⁸ The conferences Admiral Leahy attended and the primary participants of each were:

Trident, May 12-24, 1943, Washington, D.C.

Roosevelt, Churchill, Soong.

Quadrant, August 14-24, 1943, Quebec. Roosevelt, Churchill, Soong.

Sextant, November 23-26, December 2-6, 1943, Cairo. Roosevelt, Churchill, Chiang.

Eureka, November 28-December 1, 1943, Teheran. Roosevelt, Churchill, Stalin.

Octagon, September 11-16, 1944, Quebec. Roosevelt, Churchill.

Argonaut, February 2-11, 1945, Yalta. Roosevelt,

³⁸Ibid., p. 2.

Churchill, Stalin.

Terminal, July 16-August 1, 1945, Potsdam. Truman, Churchill, Atlee, Stalin.³⁹

In view of his participation in decision making at the highest level, Admiral Leahy's views on military participation in policy formulation are both interesting and pertinent:

Army and Navy "brass" frequently are accused, particularly in time of war, of seeking to override the civilian restraints imposed by our laws and by our Constitution. As this is written, I have been a part of that brass for many years and have found by experience that at times this accusation is justified. In most cases the stepping out of bounds arises from a zeal to prosecute a war in such a manner that our enemies may be vanquished in the shortest possible time.⁴⁰

VII. PLANNING FOR POST-WAR YEARS

As the outcome of the war became more certainly predictable and the victory of the Allies became surer, the Joint Chiefs of Staff joined with other segments of the government in considering the role to be played by the military in the post-war period. A great deal of their thoughts were directed toward the organizational structure in which the military should be placed. Unification of the armed forces was a subject of long and sometimes bitter debate by national leaders. The JCS discussed this subject in closed

³⁹Ibid., p. 489-495.

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 268.

session on May 15, 1944. General Marshall favored a statutory JCS with a single cabinet-level officer in charge of all elements of national defense. The Navy's position as stated by Admiral King opposed a single defense organization. Admiral Leahy said that the ad hoc system developed during the war seemed to be working well and suggested that the problem be further studied. Interestingly, all parties to this discussion believed that the JCS should be responsible only to the President.⁴¹

The civilian leaders of the military departments were also concerned with the actions needed to improve the peacetime policy-making apparatus of the national government. A foremost architect of the post-war organization was to be the first Secretary of Defense, James Forrestal. In April, 1945, while Secretary of the Navy, he believed that the Army and Navy should not be the makers of policy but should define the military necessities of the nation to the policy makers, both for defense and for maintaining world peace.⁴² He further foresaw, in June, 1945, the need for a post-war organization to enable the military services and other government departments and agencies to provide for and protect national

⁴¹Ibid., p. 239.

⁴²Walter Millis (ed.), The Forrestal Diaries (New York: The Viking Press, 1951), p. 63.

security.⁴³

These debates, discussions, and disagreements were to be reflected in the post-war problems attendant to establishing a revised policy-making machinery.

VIII. SUMMARY

In this period the Navy's role in policy making was changing dramatically in two respects. In its infancy, the Navy had contributed to foreign policy formulation primarily through the action of individuals and most often at great distances from the national capital. The passage of time had seen the Navy's contributions come more frequently through an organizational structure and at the seat of the government. This trend continued in the post-war period, as will be evident in the following chapter.

There is little question that the Navy has contributed to the formulation of foreign policy from the nineteenth century to the present. This examination has revealed a change in the methods by which the Navy's contributions were made rather than an assessment of the qualitative or quantitative changes themselves.

⁴³Ibid., p. 45.

CHAPTER III

POST-WAR ORGANIZATION AND REORGANIZATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

The present role of the Navy in formulating foreign policy is determined to a great extent by the organizational framework within which the Navy's policy-makers operate. It should be instructive, therefore, to examine the Department of Defense, its evolution, and the place of the Navy therein.

I. THE FIRST MOVES TOWARD REORGANIZATION

During World War II, the heads of the military services functioned as a corporate body entitled the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As was pointed out in the preceding chapter, the legislative base for this body was non-existent, but it wielded considerable influence over the making of policy in the war years.

When the war was over, the need for formalizing the ad hoc arrangements of the war years arose. The problem was to alter the prevailing arrangement rather than to return to the status quo ante bellum because the events of the war had proven that a return to pre-World War II relationships was not desirable. A new place in the international community for the United States and new requirements for national security had been outgrowths of the war. A new organization

for national security was needed to meet the new situation.

The necessity for a greater degree of inter-service co-operation than previously practiced was recognized by both civilian and military leaders. The advent of atomic weapons presaged a revolution in military thought, as the disciples of Mitchell and Douhet, who had been unable to prove their doctrines in World War II, saw in the new weapons another chance to prevail in war with air power alone. Since these changes had taken place, a return to the independent departments of earlier days was considered unsatisfactory by a majority of leaders in government.

Alteration was desirable, but the nub of the question was the direction and extent of alteration. Congress feared a single military czar, commander of all the armed forces of the nation. As Huntington notes, such an organization would have strengthened the voice of the military in government since it would have spoken with one voice rather than two or three.¹ At the same time "both the President and the Congress wanted to be able to deal with the military establishment as a whole (while, to be sure, preserving the option

¹Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and The State (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957), p. 87.

to deal with its parts as well.)"²

Nonetheless, the President and most Army officers desired the creation of a single military chief of staff. The Navy opposed such a plan. The Army Air Corps continued its battle for autonomy. Suggestions had been advanced for formation of a high level body to determine national policy. All of these issues were debated against a background of demobilization, diminishing interest in military affairs, fatigue with war, and lack of a widespread awareness of the threat posed the United States by the Soviet Union and international communism.

It has been said that the early consideration of legislation on military unification fell into two major stages: (1) 1944 to early 1946, when the primary concern was with the general structural questions, and (2) 1946 to July, 1947, when the concern was centered on the forces, functions, and status of the Navy.³ Throughout both periods the Navy sought an organizational structure emphasizing voluntary co-ordination, basically horizontal in nature. The Army preferred a more nearly vertical structure with

²Paul Y. Hammond, Organizing For Defense--The American Military Establishment in the Twentieth Century (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1961), p. 222.

³Ibid., p. 228.

greater authority vested in a military chief of staff and a single civilian secretary. In broad terms the Congress was more favorable to the Navy's position, the President to the Army's, although by 1946 the Congress had already merged the Military and Naval Affairs Committees and the Army and Navy Appropriations Subcommittees.⁴

The Congress received the administration's first proposed plan for post-war organization in December, 1945. This plan, which proposed a single department of the armed forces and a single military chief of staff, was not well received by the Congress and was rejected. Congress also rejected the second proposal, which would have created a single executive department containing all three services. This proposal had carried the endorsement of the Secretaries of War and the Navy. During the fall and winter of 1946-47, a third compromise plan was developed to which both services agreed. The following summer the Congress enacted this plan into law as the National Security Act of 1947.⁵

⁴Ibid.

⁵Huntington, op. cit., p. 422.
National Security Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 495, Public Law 253, 80th Congress, July 27, 1947.

II. THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947

It is not an exaggeration to describe the National Security Act of 1947 as the most important and far-reaching piece of peacetime military legislation in the nation's history. This act created the National Military Establishment headed by a civilian secretary, the Secretary of Defense. Within the National Military Establishment existed the three service departments, each of which enjoyed the status of an executive department. The Army Air Corps was divorced from the Army and became the United States Air Force, forming a part of the newly created Department of the Air Force. The national intelligence effort was concentrated in a newly created agency, the Central Intelligence Agency, in which one of the two top officials could be a military officer on active duty.

At the apex of the organization created by the Act of 1947 was a new policy organ, the National Security Council. Among the functions of the Council described by the Act was that of advising the "President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security so as to enable the military services and the other departments and agencies of the Government to co-operate more effectively in matters involving the national

security."⁶ Members of the National Security Council were the President, the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Director of Mutual Security, the Chairman of the National Resources Board (which was also created by the Act), and the Service Secretaries. Provision was also made for the necessary staff support for the Council.

Within the National Military Establishment the existence of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was given statutory authorization by the Act of 1947. To provide staff for the Chiefs, a Joint Staff was created with membership limited to one hundred officers. From the relatively small size of this staff, it is apparent that most of the staff support for the service chiefs would continue to come from their own service staffs. Nevertheless, for the first time, the United States had a joint military staff that was based on statutory authority. The role and importance of this staff was to increase in the coming years.

To provide a body for co-ordinating the broad policy of the National Military Establishment, the Act of 1947 created the Armed Forces Policy Council. This body consisted of the Secretary of Defense (and, later, his Deputy), the

⁶National Security Act of 1947, op. cit., Title I, Section 101 (a).

service secretaries, and the service chiefs. Even so, the service secretaries and chiefs retained the right of direct access to the President. This right is generally considered an important indication of an official's stature and influence in official Washington.

The act did not provide the Secretary of Defense with either the staff support or the authority to rival the Joint Chiefs of Staff or the service departments in making and administering policy.⁷ His role was to provide a link between the National Security Council, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the services.⁸ The rather limited scope of the Secretary's power is evident from Forrestal's conception of his role as involving predominantly the negotiation of consensus with the military establishment.⁹ Furthermore, during his tenure in office, Secretary Forrestal was made aware that the major decisions on national security would be made in the White House and that he would execute them to the best of his ability.¹⁰ As first created, the office of the Secretary of Defense, while an important one, did not carry an extraordinary amount of power within the Government. It provided an opportunity for the Secretary to make his views known, but it did not insure that the civilian or military leaders

⁷Hammond, op. cit., p. 231. ⁸Ibid.

⁹Ibid., p. 232.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 234.

would support the same positions.

Secretary Forrestal, who had led the Navy's fight against excessive unification while Secretary of the Navy, discovered that the Secretary of Defense required additional authority if his job was to be done effectively. Consequently, in his first report, he recommended, inter alia: (1) a clarification of the authority of the Secretary of Defense (implicit in such clarification would be an increase), (2) the provision of an Under Secretary of Defense, (3) the provision of a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and (4) the removal of the service secretaries from the National Security Council.¹¹

Implementation of these recommendations would obviously increase the power of the Secretary of Defense and result in greater centralization of authority in the National Military Establishment. Within two years of the Secretary's report, all of the recommended changes above had been both accepted and implemented. This action had considerable impact on the manner in which military positions regarding foreign policy problems were put forward. The services no longer had representation on the National Security Council and were required to act through proxies--the Secretary of Defense and, when participating, the Chairman of the Joint

¹¹Ibid., p. 239.

Chiefs of Staff.

Another move toward unifying the strategic direction of the nation's military effort took place with the Key West Agreement in 1948. Although this agreement dealt primarily with determining the functions of the several services, it also emphasized the duty of the Joint Chiefs to provide integrated or unified military staff plans rather than compilations of service oriented plans for use as guide lines in the development of the various programs of the National Military Establishment.¹²

III. THE 1949 AMENDMENTS

In 1949 the Eberstadt task force of the Hoover Commission completed its investigation of the organization of the national military effort. It concluded that a single chief of staff was not needed since the President and the Secretary of Defense (underlining supplied) filled this role. The task force believed that a single chief of staff would result in too much power being placed in military hands with "consequent dangers to our democratic institutions."¹³ The

¹²Ibid., p. 237.

¹³Phillip Barry Brannen, "A Single Service: Perennial Issue in National Defense," United States Naval Institute Proceedings, 83:1283-1284, December, 1957.

task force further feared that a single chief of staff system would suppress differences of opinion and "when military differences disappear, military progress will cease."¹⁴

In view of the conclusions of the Hoover Commission and the recommendations of the Secretary of Defense, the first amendments to the National Security Act of 1947 were enacted by Congress in August, 1949. These amendments were of sufficient significance to affect materially the entire national defense organization. In addition, they indicated clearly a move toward greater unification and centralization.

Several weaknesses and limitations in the authority of the Secretary of Defense were eliminated by the 1949 amendments, viz: (1) the status of the military services were degraded from that of executive departments to that of military departments within the Department of Defense (previously the National Military Establishment), (2) the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense was no longer limited by the word "general," (3) the Secretary of Defense was designated the principal assistant to the President in all matters relating to the Department of Defense, (4) direct access to the President by the service

¹⁴Howard E. Orem, "Shall We Junk The JCS?", United States Naval Institute Proceedings, 84:59, February, 1958.

chiefs and secretaries was eliminated although these officials could go to the Congress, (5) the "States Rights" clause, which reserved to the services all authority not specifically granted to the Secretary of Defense, was revoked, (6) the service secretaries lost their seats on the National Security Council, (7) three Assistant Secretaries were authorized the Secretary of Defense (an Under Secretary had been provided earlier in the year by separate legislation with the title changed to Deputy Secretary by these amendments),¹⁵ and (8) the position of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was created.¹⁶

It is obvious that these changes placed considerably greater authority in the hands of the Secretary of Defense. Although the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was to be a military officer, the creation of this position was intended to assist the Joint Chiefs in rising above service interests and acting for the overall good.¹⁷

Another endorsement of greater centralization is indicated by the Congressional approval of an increase in the size of the Joint Staff of the JCS from one hundred to two

¹⁵Timothy W. Stanley, American Defense and National Security (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1956), p. 96.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 91-93.

¹⁷Huntington, op. cit., p. 436.

hundred and ten members. The creation of the office of the Chairman and the increase in the size of the Joint Staff caused a great deal of soul searching in the Congress where the specter of the man on horseback still concerned many. The office of the Chairman was surrounded by strict safeguards, and its powers were narrowly defined.¹⁸

IV. THE KOREAN WAR PERIOD

The Korean War provided a test of the nation's new military organization under stress conditions. All in all, the organization performed well although not always in the manner in which its designers had anticipated it would. Prior to the outbreak of the war, President Truman had made it a point not to sit regularly with the National Security Council since he feared that his presence would imply a delegation of authority to that body that he did not intend to make.¹⁹ A great deal of the planning at this time took place in informal discussions between the working staffs of the State and Defense Departments.²⁰ There was a weekly meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and representatives of the State Department, usually the Deputy Secretary, the Chief of the Policy Planning Staff, and the Assistant Secre-

¹⁸Ibid., p. 442.

¹⁹Hammond, op. cit., p. 232.

²⁰Ibid., p. 248.

tary for Far Eastern Affairs. Representation from the civilian elements in the Defense Department did not begin until the summer of 1951.²¹ Secretary Marshall did, however, occasionally meet with the Chiefs.²²

This period marked the emergence of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs as a major molders of policy. This official handled numerous important matters without reference to the Secretary for decision.²³ The strong link between this office and the State Department was beginning to form.

The major change made in the structure of the Department during this period was effected by the Congress with the passage of the Marine Corps Act in 1952. This legislation provided that on issues that the Commandant of the Marine Corps considered as directly affecting the Marine Corps he would serve as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with a voice and vote equal to that of the other service chiefs.²⁴ This act is also the only legislation which establishes minimum unit strength for one of the armed services.²⁵ It should be noted that after this time, despite

²¹Ibid.

²²Ibid., p. 249.

²³Ibid., p. 255.

²⁴Nathan F. Twining, "The JCS," Ordnance, 42:898, May-June, 1959.

²⁵Samuel P. Huntington, The Common Defense (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), p. 140.

bitter budget battles and shifting strategies, the organizational existence of no service was seriously threatened by another.²⁶

V. THE REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1953

The desire still persisted to increase the authority of the Secretary of Defense, nonetheless; the urge to merge had abated, but the craving for greater centralization continued. Upon his retirement in 1952, Secretary of Defense Lovett proposed that the Secretary of Defense be designated unambiguously as the Deputy Commander in Chief.²⁷ The proposal that Congress had rejected six years before was again in circulation, and based on the experiences of the Korean War, Congress and the Administration took another searching look at the Defense Department. The Reorganization Act of 1953 resulted.

It is instructive to compare the changes made to the national military organization by the Amendments of 1949 and the Reorganization Act of 1953. The former was based on two years of operation in a perilous but peaceful period. The 1953 reorganization could consider the experiences of four more years of operation, which included the Korean War. Because of this, one would imagine that the 1953 changes

²⁶Ibid., p. 373. ²⁷Hammond, op. cit., p. 229.

would be more far-reaching and of greater consequence. On the contrary, however, when compared to the sweeping amendments of 1949, the changes of 1953 appear to be a tidying-up operation. Certainly, significant alterations to defense machinery were made in 1953, but the basic structure was left unchanged.

Just as World War II had witnessed a divorce between the military and civilian components of the service departments, so the Korean War saw the Joint Chiefs of Staff again taking the major role. State Department influence was much greater than in the Second World War, but again the civilian elements of the military departments did not participate to the fullest extent. The primary purpose of the changes in 1953, then, was to improve the relationship of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the rest of the Defense Department.²⁸

One avenue of approach was an increase in the staff support provided the Secretary of Defense--six more assistant secretaries and a general counsel were authorized. Another tactic was to reduce the tendency of the Joint Chiefs to operate forces and to emphasize their responsibility as strategic planners. This was done by making the military departments rather than members of the Joint Chiefs the executive agents for the unified commands. The service

²⁸Ibid., p. 324.

secretary could delegate this responsibility to the chief of the service; thus, in actual practice, the same officer could be functioning as the executive agent under both the old and new systems. In the new system, however, the chain of command was through the service secretary to the Secretary of Defense rather than through the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The most debated changes in 1953 related to the authority of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It will be recalled that Congress had approached the establishment of this office with considerable reluctance in 1949. Proposals in 1953 to increase the authority of the Chairman met with great Congressional resistance. The House Committee on Government Operations disapproved the proposed increase in the Chairman's authority. The proposal was, however, passed in the House itself by a vote of 234 to 108.²⁹ The size and fervor of the dissenting bloc indicated that the Congress had gone as far as it would in strengthening the Chairman's office at that time.

The proposals appear innocuous now, in light of events since 1953, but at the time Congressmen read sinister threats into them. These particular proposals arose mainly from President Eisenhower's desire that the Joint Staff

²⁹Huntington, The Soldier and The State, p. 422.

possess more of the characteristics of a unified staff and that the business of the Joint Chiefs be handled more smoothly.³⁰ In sum, the changes gave the Chairman management responsibility and authority over the Joint Staff and authority to approve or reject nominees for the Joint Staff from the services.³¹ Opposing Congressmen had feared that this arrangement might lead to the development of a Joint Staff that would in reality reflect the Chairman's views and thus be a personal general staff.³²

VI. THE CHAIRMAN AND THE CHIEFS

The role of the Chairman did not develop in the fashion that the architects of the Defense Department organization had envisioned in 1949. Although the office had been designed to assist the Chiefs in rising above service loyalties, actually its main impact had been in civil-military relations. The Chairman had emerged as the military spokesman for the Defense Department and was serving as a link between the Department and the White House.³³ General Omar Bradley, Chairman for four years, made two hundred seventy-two visits to the White House and attended sixty-eight meet-

³⁰Hammond, op. cit., p. 321. ³¹Ibid., p. 288.

³²Stanley, op. cit., p. 106.

³³Huntington, The Soldier and The State, p. 436.

ings of the National Security Council. President Eisenhower received a weekly briefing from the Chairman on the military situation.³⁴

This arrangement had the effect of making the Chairman not only spokesman for the military but also spokesman for the President to the military. If the Secretary of Defense showed any reluctance to initiate policy, an aggressive Chairman was admirably situated to exert predominant influence in the development of military policy.

Despite protestations to the contrary, the Reorganization Act of 1953 continued the reduction of the power of the military departments. This had also been a major result of the Amendments of 1949. By this time, the ability of the Comptroller to affect strategic plans by his handling of the budget was beginning to be felt increasingly. As Huntington states, "A reduction of five percent in military estimates might be the result of acute fiscal management; a reduction of twenty-two percent necessarily implied basic decisions of strategy. . . . So long as the Secretary of Defense was unable to arrive at an independent balancing of military and fiscal demands, the basic decisions on military policy were inevitably the result of the political battles of the Comptroller vs. the Chiefs."³⁵ Paul Y. Hammond says, "In place

³⁴Ibid.

³⁵Ibid., p. 440.

of unifying by strategy, the Defense Department achieved its consolidated programs with the blue pencil of the Deputy Secretary (Robert Lovett) or the Comptroller (Wilfred J. MacNeil)."³⁶

Thus, pressure was on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Their plans and strategic concepts depended upon their budgets, which were receiving a striking amount of attention from the Comptroller. Because the executive agents for the unified commands were now the military departments, the Joint Chiefs had marginal authority in that area at best. As a matter of fact, in referring to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1957, Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, the Chief of Naval Operations, said, "They do not command anything."³⁷

The Joint Chiefs were alleged by their detractors to be unable to rise above the interests of their services. This situation was believed to result in their deliberations and pronouncements as a corporate body being in the nature of bargains and compromises, rather than "decisions based on judgment which transcended service interests."³⁸

Criticism was also leveled at the Joint Chiefs because

³⁶Hammond, op. cit., p. 252.

³⁷Arleigh A. Burke, "The JCS In Operation," United States Naval Institute Proceedings, 83:337, March, 1957.

³⁸Hammond, op. cit., p. 327-328.

of their inability to agree on all issues with the result that "split" papers were sent to the Secretary of Defense for decision. Gene M. Lyons made the point that "the greatest part of the increase of authority gained by the civilian leadership in the Department of Defense has accrued because of the inability of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to come to agreed positions on the military requirements of national security."³⁹

On the other hand, Admiral Burke declares that splits per se are not a bad thing; they permit the civilians heading the department to know what is going on and thereby insure effective civilian control. "If knowledge of the alternatives, as well as the main issues, is not regularly available to them (civilian officials), you do not have effective civilian control."⁴⁰

Undoubtedly there were sharp differences of opinion and different strategic concepts favored by the Joint Chiefs as individuals, but the theme of disagreement can easily be exaggerated. Vice Admiral Howard Orem states that the Joint Chiefs of Staff made over two thousand decisions from 1953 to 1955 and that less than two percent of these JCS decisions

³⁹Gene M. Lyons, "The New Civil-Military Relations," American Political Science Review, 50:55, March, 1961.

⁴⁰Burke, op. cit., p. 339.

were split.⁴¹ General Nathan Twining, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and former Chief of Staff of the Air Force, also declares that the Joint Chiefs disagreed less than two percent of the time.⁴²

In line with these observations, James Forrestal made a statement that remains as pertinent now as when it was made in 1945:

The JCS, while it was accused of being a debating society, for that very reason probably was the most practical and useful device that could have been conceived for the conduct of the war. . . . It is a pretty good thing for anyone charged with the responsibility of great decisions to have to maintain his point of view before an earnest and intelligent opposition.⁴³

The Joint Chiefs of Staff system was not faultless in the 1950s but neither did the system contain major structural defects.

VII. THE 1958 REORGANIZATION

It is understandable that the changes proposed in the reorganization of 1958 did not attempt to make basic changes in the existing structure. In sending the administration's proposal to Congress in April, 1958, President Eisenhower said, "Clearly we should preserve the traditional form and pattern of the services but should regroup and redefine cer-

⁴¹Orem, loc. cit.

⁴²Twining, op. cit., p. 900.

⁴³Millis, op. cit., p. 92.

tain service responsibilities."⁴⁴

Perhaps the most significant action of the Reorganization Act of 1958 was the abolition of the system of executive agents for unified commands.⁴⁵ The unified commanders would now report to the Secretary of Defense through the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Depending upon one's interpretation, this may or may not be considered as putting the Joint Chiefs into the business of controlling operations, but they were surely much more involved in operations than before this change.⁴⁶

Other provisions in the 1958 reorganization included another increase in the size of the Joint Staff. The new personnel ceiling was established as four hundred, exactly four times the number authorized eleven years before.⁴⁷ The increasing importance of the Joint Staff is obvious. With the increase in personnel, the Joint Staff changed its structure from a committee-oriented arrangement to a staff organi-

⁴⁴Ace L. Waters, Jr. and Jack L. Rogers, "The Reorganization of the Department of Defense," *Armor*, 68:18, January-February, 1959.

⁴⁵Twining, op. cit. p. 898.

⁴⁶In Organizing For Defense, p. 376, Hammond seems to misjudge this arrangement by stating that the JCS "has crossed the dividing line from planning to operations." He dismisses rather lightly the fact that command is vested in the Secretary of Defense. The real increase in authority here accrues to the unified commanders rather than to the JCS.

⁴⁷Twining, loc. cit.

zation. Recalling the distinction in World War II between joint staff planning and joint committee work (page 31, supra) makes apparent the significance of this organization of the Joint Staff.

A step richer in symbolic value than practical applicability was the provision that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff could vote in that body. Since matters are not decided by a show of hands in the Joint Chiefs of Staff meetings, this provision did not have much direct practical effect. It did, however, indicate a willingness on the part of the Congress as well as the administration for the Chairman's position to acquire more prestige.

An eminently practical step was taken when the vice chiefs of staff were authorized to perform some duties previously reserved exclusively to the chief of the service. This authorization was made contingent on the delegation of authority by the chief of service--however, before this the duties could not be delegated regardless of the desires of the chief of service. The rationale behind this change was to lessen the service workload on the chief of the service so that he could devote more of his effort to his duties as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Under the Reorganization Act of 1958, the Secretary of Defense gained increased power to transfer, abolish, reassign, or consolidate non-combatant functions within the

Department. This authority has been used more by Secretary McNamara than by his predecessors.

The final provision of the 1958 act to be discussed was the establishment of the position and organization of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering. This official, more than any other, determines the nature of future weapon systems.⁴⁸ This power arises from his duties, which include: (1) acting as principal adviser to the Secretary on scientific and technical matters, (2) supervising all research and engineering activities in the Department of Defense, and (3) directing and controlling the research and engineering activities in the Department that the Secretary determines to require centralized management.⁴⁹

In short, as Hammond says, "The 1958 reorganization was a decision all the more in favor of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the source of policy leadership for the military establishment."⁵⁰ He believes that the only impediment to a great gain in power by the Joint Chiefs lies in their possessing divided loyalties.⁵¹ This view cannot be entirely accepted. The size, scope, and authority of the various seg-

⁴⁸William R. Kintner, "Progress in Defense Organization," Journal of Public Law, 9:79, Spring, 1960.

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 78.

⁵⁰Hammond, op. cit., p. 329.

⁵¹Ibid.

ments of the staff in the Office of the Secretary of Defense make it unlikely that the Joint Chiefs of Staff could gain very much more power even if the situation is considered in the light of structural organization alone. Another argument against Mr. Hammond's view, and it seems a conclusive one, is the manner in which Secretary McNamara has taken charge of the Department and has conducted its affairs.

VIII. THE CURRENT STATUS

In conjunction with the statement above, it may be well to examine the Defense Department under Mr. McNamara's leadership. Although there have been no further legislative reorganizations of the Defense Department since the Act of 1958, extremely significant changes have been made under the authority granted the Secretary in the 1958 Act. In October, 1961, U.S. News and World Report stated that Secretary McNamara sought not a single service but a centralized Defense set-up.⁵² His methods of achieving the desired degree of centralization have been interesting and instructive to observe and generally successful in attaining their aims.

Among the most important organizational actions taken by Mr. McNamara have been the increases in the number of

⁵²"McNamara in Control: A Firm Hand At Pentagon," U.S. News and World Report, 51:63-67, October 2, 1961.

centralized joint agencies. Specific reference is made here to the Defense Communications Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Defense Supply Agency, and the Defense Atomic Support Agency. To be accurate, it must be noted that not all of these agencies were created during Secretary McNamara's term of office. It has been during that time, however, that they have achieved impressive proportions. The purpose of each of these agencies, generally, is to eliminate duplication in the work of the services and the department's other agencies and elements. Considerable success is claimed for them by their proponents.

At present the position of the Secretary of Defense still falls short of the one-man rule so feared by the Congresses of the immediate post-war period. The official in this cabinet post does, however, have powers far exceeding those first granted in 1947. Paul Y. Hammond has posed the question of the role of the Secretary of Defense since the objectives of defense policy are established by the State Department, the requirements to achieve the objectives are determined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the funds to provide the requirements are administered by the Bureau of the Budget.⁵³ The answer to this question is that while the

⁵³Paul Y. Hammond, "Decision-Making in Defense: The Role of Organization. Effects of Structure on Policy," Public Administration Review, 18:176, Summer, 1958.

Secretary of Defense does not have exclusive responsibility in any of these areas, he has major responsibilities in each of them. It is he who must insure that the various elements are brought together in a viable defense policy.

In practice the Secretaries of Defense have functioned more as a delegate of the American people to the military than as a delegate of the military to the American people.⁵⁴ This has prevented the development of military positions that failed to take due account of the overall national and international situation. The military elements in the Defense Department have not been permitted to proceed in their planning with blinders on. It is, of course, entirely possible that military planning could have been accomplished with equal realism and success without this kind of control.

The distinction between the present system and its predecessors is highlighted by the existence of the National Security Council with its great potential for handling and even preventing crisis situations. The preparations for the Secretary of Defense's participation in deliberations of the Council demonstrate the depth as well as the scope of the development of the Defense Department. Staff support for the Secretary's participation in Council matters comes not only from the Joint Chiefs of Staff but also and perhaps

⁵⁴Huntington, The Soldier and The State, p. 441.

even more from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.⁵⁵

As this indicates, the responsibilities and influence of the assistant secretaries of defense have been steadily growing. One of the most influential of these officials is the aforementioned Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs. This official is responsible for establishing the Department's positions and plans relating to such subjects as foreign military affairs, military assistance plans and programs, the regional security organizations, the United Nations, and overseas base rights.⁵⁶

Other assistant secretaries have similar responsibilities in their own areas of activity and authority. Limitations do exist in the authority of the assistant secretaries in relations with the military departments. An assistant secretary can issue orders to a military department only if he receives written authority from the Secretary of Defense with respect to a specific subject area, and the orders are issued through the service secretaries or their designated representatives.⁵⁷

The latter stipulation, above, raises the question of

⁵⁵Kintner, op. cit., p. 82.

⁵⁶Hammond, Organizing For Defense, p. 307-308.

⁵⁷Ibid., p. 81.

the present position of the service secretaries in the national policy machinery. Theoretically, the service secretaries should function as lower level policy strategists in support of the Secretary of Defense. In practice, however, this has not proven a realistic role for these officials. They do not hold positions on the primary policy making bodies and efforts to provide them with a vehicle for such work have not been fruitful.⁵⁸ Huntington considers that the "most satisfactory role for the service secretaries is probably to represent the principle of decentralization by serving as spokesmen for the military and civilian needs of their services."⁵⁹ Lyons believes that this is in fact the present practice, "A service secretary is more and more a spokesman for the service; less and less a policy making instrument for the Secretary of Defense."⁶⁰

Nevertheless, the impression persists that the Joint Chiefs of Staff are the central military spokesmen--with the exception of the Secretary of Defense, himself.⁶¹ The rapid turnover of top civilian officials has no doubt contributed to this situation. Colonel Kintner has noted that a year is required for an official to master the duties of his office, and Kintner then observes that the average term for top

⁵⁸Huntington, The Soldier and The State, p. 431.

⁵⁹Ibid. ⁶⁰Lyons, loc. cit.

⁶¹Kintner, op. cit., p. 83.

civilian officials in the Defense Department is eighteen months.⁶² For example, the first secretaries of both the Army and the Navy in the Kennedy administration had been replaced before the administration was seventeen months old.

David Lawrence believes that the Secretary of Defense should "make better use of the military minds so that civilian authority will have the best available advice."⁶³ He does not suggest organizational changes to effect this and apparently has in mind a greater reliance by the Secretary on the Joint Chiefs. Mr. Lawrence states that in practice the Secretary of Defense is the Deputy Commander in Chief.⁶⁴

Such a situation insures civilian control of the military at the department level. As a matter of fact, the Chief of Staff of the Army alleged in 1958 that there were nineteen civilians in the chain of command between him and the President.⁶⁵

The services have exerted more effort in the past few years than ever before to maintain a cordial working relation-

⁶²William R. Kintner, Forging A New Sword (New York: Harper & Brothers, Publishers, 1958), p. 71; also "Progress in Defense Organization," p. 92.

⁶³David Lawrence, "An Impossible Job," U.S. News and World Report, 47:120, December 14, 1961.

⁶⁴Ibid.

⁶⁵Laurence I. Radway, "Decision-Making in Defense: The Role of Organization. Uniforms and Mufti: What Place in Policy?," Public Administration Review, 18:182-183, Summer, 1958.

ship with Congress. Expenditures by the military for legislative liaison doubled from 1953 to 1958;⁶⁶ for although Congress has chosen to exercise but little control over any strategic decisions, it still holds the purse strings for the defense budget. It is interesting to note, however, that except when confronted with similar competing programs, since World War II Congress has not vetoed directly "a major strategic program, a force level recommendation, or a major weapons system proposed by the administration in power."⁶⁷ Congressional willingness to have the executive agencies make these determinations was perhaps most succinctly expressed by Senator Russell of Georgia, "If Congress starts legislating military strategy, God help the American people."⁶⁸

IX. SUMMARY

In summary, the years since the end of World War II have witnessed a remarkable change in the place of the armed forces in the governmental structure. In the pre-war years, the military spoke through two Cabinet level officials who

⁶⁶Samuel P. Huntington, "Interservice Competition and the Political Roles of the Armed Services," American Political Science Review, 50:41, March, 1961.

⁶⁷Huntington, The Common Defense, p. 133.

⁶⁸New York Times, March 15, 1959, p. 17.

were not often competing for funds or projects since their budgets and organizations were entirely separate. During the war the uniformed voice of the military services gained center stage and exerted considerable influence on the nation's policies. Since the war, however, the uniformed segment of the services has moved into the background. The major voice of the military is now the Secretary of Defense.

The Secretary of Defense gets his staff support from the Office of the Secretary of Defense as well as the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the individual services. Therefore, the input to policy by the services is through a proxy and is often channeled to this proxy (the Secretary) through the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In this sense the voice of the military in policy making has been muted.

Another aspect of the present situation provides a contradictory conclusion. Because of the prevailing international situation, the newly accepted major position of the United States in the world arena, and the changing nature of the military threat to the country, military aspects of policy are much more important now than they were in earlier years. Consequently, the need for military advice and counsel in the upper echelons of government is greater than it has been in previous periods of peace. This has resulted in more inputs to policy from the military.

It is difficult to determine which of these conditions

has the greater effect. It is probable that an objective analysis by historians of the future will determine that despite the filter of departmental structure through which it must pass, military input to and influence on policy is now greater than during any other period in which the nation has been at peace.

CHAPTER IV

THE NAVY'S RECOGNITION OF ITS ROLE

Has the changing role of the Navy in the formulation of foreign policy stirred any interest in the officer corps of the Navy? Is there evidence that naval officers have become increasingly aware of the importance of this subject to their service and to themselves? If so, what is being done about it? This chapter will endeavor to answer the first two of these questions; the next chapter will address the last.

The Navy has always viewed itself as the nation's first line of defense. Additionally, in years gone by, the Navy's officers saw themselves as the instruments of the nation for diplomatic actions in far away places. This concept can be seen in John Paul Jones's famous letter to the Marine Committee in September, 1775:

The naval officer should be familiar with the principles of international law. . . . He should also be conversant with the usages of diplomacy and capable of maintaining, if called upon, a dignified and judicious diplomatic correspondence; because it often happens that sudden emergencies in foreign waters make him the diplomatic as well as military representative of his country, and in such cases he may have to act without opportunity of consulting civic or ministerial superiors at home, and such action may easily involve the portentous issue of peace or war between great powers.¹

¹Letter from John Paul Jones to Marine Committee,

With the introduction and widespread use of long range communications, the necessity for making foreign policy on the spot declined. No longer did the senior American official at the scene find himself confronted with a problem for which he had no guidance. Explicit and detailed guidance could be obtained in a timely fashion by radio. The officers of the Navy found their involvement in policy making of this kind greatly reduced.

As might be expected, the interests of the officer corps turned to fields in which their active participation was required. But, as the procedures for making policy changed and as the Navy again had the opportunity to contribute to policy making, there arose again the need for naval officers to be knowledgeable in the fields of foreign policy, international relations, and national security policy.

I. METHODOLOGY

The method used in this study to determine the degree to which the officer corps of the Navy has recognized this need was an analysis of the material naval officers had been reading and writing since the turn of the century. The United States Naval Institute Proceedings was chosen as the

September, 1775, in George R. Clark et al., A Short History of the United States Navy (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1939), p. 419.

best index to the reading and writing habits of the officer corps.

The United States Naval Institute describes itself as a private, professional society for all who are interested in naval and maritime affairs. A large number of naval officers belong to the organization and receive its monthly publication, Proceedings. Further, it is a rare wardroom that does not have the latest copy of the Proceedings available for its members. Topics of current interest to the officer corps are addressed, analyzed, and debated in the pages of the Proceedings. Because the Naval Institute is a self-supporting, non-profit organization and is not a part of the Navy Department, its contributors can address subjects and express views that have not been officially accepted or promulgated. Thus, the Proceedings provides a forum for the expression of ideas that are each author's own since articles published do not necessarily reflect the view of either the Navy Department or the Naval Institute.

The Board of Control of the Naval Institute is comprised of elected members. Usually these men are senior officers on active duty. With only one exception (1878-79), the president of the Naval Institute has been an admiral. Frequently, as is the case at present, the Chief of Naval Operations serves as the President.

Because of its professional nature, its senior

officer leadership, its widespread following in the officer corps, and its prestige, the Proceedings can be considered a valid index to the professional interests of the officer corps.

To determine the degree of interest shown by naval officers in foreign policy, an analysis was made of the content of various issues of the magazine since the turn of the century. Individual issues covering twenty-one full years were considered. The years selected for analysis were those marking the beginning of each decade and the years immediately preceding and following. Accordingly, all the issues in each of the following years were used in the analysis: 1899-1901, 1909-1911, 1919-1921, 1929-1931, 1939-1941, 1949-1951, and 1959-1961.² This selection should provide a good cross section since it included both peacetime and war-time as well as years just before and just after wars.

Three items were analyzed in each of the issues considered; viz: (1) the subject matter of all the articles in the issue, (2) the subject matter of the lead article in the issue, and (3) the subject of the books reviewed in the issue.

²United States Naval Institute Proceedings, Volumes 25, 26, 27, 35, 36, 37, 45, 46, 47, 55, 56, 57, 65, 66, 67, 75, 76, 77, 85, 86, and 87. These volumes correspond to the dates in the text. Every issue in each of the volumes was included in the analysis.

The reason for the first item is obvious--a count of articles by subject matter should provide a basis for meaningful comparisons. The Proceedings usually places the most significant article in the place of honor as lead article for the issue. This is demonstrated by the position accorded prize essays in annual competitions. Therefore, a determination of which subject has been accorded this position should provide an indication of the editor's evaluation of the article's significance. Since the editor receives guidance from senior officers on the Board of Control and since he is aware of all the articles received (both published and rejected), the lead article should reflect the thinking of a large part of the officer corps as far as the article's importance is concerned. For basically the same reasons, the selection of books to be reviewed in the pages of the Proceedings should reflect the interests of the officer corps.

The articles and book reviews were classified by subject matter in this analysis. The classifications were not identical for the two. In order to understand fully the results of the analysis, a knowledge of the classifications used is essential.

Articles were separated into nine classifications. Often an article addressed subject matter in more than one classification. In such cases the article was classified

according to the major point being presented or pressed by the author. The classifications used in the analysis are described in the following paragraphs.

Foreign policy. This classification included articles on the nation's relations with other nations; on political/economic philosophies, i.e., fascism, socialism, communism; and on international relations in general. It should be noted that the distinction between this classification and the one following was sometimes a fine one. The two classifications were both of importance to this analysis.

National security policy. This classification included articles on the organization of the United States government and the national defense effort. The latter subject was expanded to include the size of the armed forces and the employment of the various elements of national military power. Hence, articles on the unification of the armed forces fell into this classification as did those of earlier years that stated the case for an enlarged navy. Because this classification and the preceding one were those that reflect the interest of the officer corps in the Navy's role in the development of foreign policy, they were the two of greatest importance to this analysis. Hereinafter, they are referred to as the primary classifications.

Administration and Personnel. This classification and those that follow had only indirect bearing on the sub-

ject at hand. They were defined for purposes of comparison and as a matter of interest. The administration and personnel classification included articles on training, service schools, and promotion as well as those specifically indicated by the title.

Equipment and Technical Information. This classification included articles dealing with materiel and hardware. The subject of articles ranged from the effect of dampness on smokeless gun powder to the use of helium in deep sea diving.

Operations. This classification included articles on fleet exercises and tactics, individual ship tactics, and similar subjects. Any strategy discussed in these articles might be called battle area or combat strategy to distinguish it from grand strategy, which was included in the national security policy classification.

U.S. History. This classification included all the articles on U.S. history that were not properly placed within another classification. The great majority of the articles in this classification were concerned with the accomplishments of the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, and Merchant Marine.

Modern Foreign History. This classification is self-explanatory except for the time frame included in "modern." In this analysis this was defined to mean that the events

addressed occurred within one hundred years of the date of publication of the article.

Non-modern Foreign History. Articles in this classification addressed events that took place more than one hundred years before the publication of the article. It could be argued that this classification and the preceding one reflect a degree of interest in foreign affairs and should be made primary classifications. The articles themselves do not fully support such an argument. Many of the articles in these classifications were so restricted in their scope that their importance was limited to describing a historical application of military force.

Foreign Navies--Appraisals. This classification included articles that evaluated or described foreign navies as they were at the time of the article. The classification included articles on all navies whether allies, potential allies, enemies, or potential enemies.

Leadership. This final classification included articles on all forms of leadership. Naturally, articles focused on leadership in the Navy predominated.

The classifications used for book reviews were slightly different from those used for articles. As before, two of the classifications were entitled Foreign Policy and National Security Policy. These classifications had the same definitions as those used for articles. Books relating

to history were divided into classifications on the basis of the type history presented and were classified as Military History or Non-military History. A classification entitled Peacetime Operations included books on explorations, research and other peacetime activities of the armed services. The final classification, Professional Information, included the broadest scope of subject matter. This classification included books ranging from advances in communications equipment to the present composition of the Soviet Union's Navy, from the status of research in underwater physiology to ordnance equipment and seamanship techniques.

During the period covered by this analysis, the Proceedings changed from a quarterly to a monthly publication. The change took place in two steps. The Proceedings changed from a quarterly to a bi-monthly in 1914 and from a bi-monthly to a monthly publication in 1917. Because of this, the first two periods considered in this analysis had only four issues annually. Therefore, to permit more meaningful comparisons, the results of the analysis include percentages as well as a numerical count of articles and book reviews by subject.

II. ANALYSIS

1899-1901. The first three year period considered contains the years immediately following the Spanish-American

War. It might be expected that the interest of the officer corps in international affairs would have been very high during this period. However, such an expectation is directly at odds with the findings of this analysis. Very little attention was paid to the primary classifications in the pages of the Proceedings published during this period. The twelve issues of these three years presented seventy-six articles to the readers. Only two of these articles could be classified as directed toward National Security Policy. Only one article addressed Foreign Policy. Therefore, only 3.9% of the articles published from 1899 to 1901 fell into the primary classifications. During the same period, none of the nine books reviewed addressed a primary classification. Books reviewed were on subjects of Professional Information and Military History. None of the lead articles addressed subjects in the primary classifications. As might be expected, fifty percent of the lead articles were on Operations.

Before the conclusion is reached that naval officers of this period were totally unaware and uninterested in the international situation, it must be noted that each issue of the Proceedings at the time included a section entitled "Notes on International Affairs." This section was basically a news service, providing information on current events. Doubtless the section served a useful purpose in keeping sea-going officers abreast of international news events, but

the inclusion of this section did not reflect a high degree of participating interest on the part of the officer corps. The section did not include evaluation of the news nor did it reflect contributions from the readers.

1909-1911. The second period analyzed showed very little increase in the level of interest shown by the officer corps in matters of foreign policy and national security policy. Of the one hundred fifty-five articles published during this period, eight (5.1%) were in the two primary classifications. This marked a slight increase over the previous period.

Interestingly, however, two of the eight articles in the primary classifications were lead articles. Thus, one issue out of six had a lead article from the primary classifications. This was a phenomenon that was evident in each of the later periods analyzed. The percentage of lead articles devoted to the primary classifications was always higher than the overall percentage of such articles. For example, in this period only 5.1% of the articles published were in the two primary classifications, but 16.7% of the lead articles were. This relationship, although not this exact ratio, was apparent in every period analyzed. Several explanations for this might be advanced. The most likely explanation is that the editors recognized works on foreign policy and national security policy as being of wider interest and of

greater merit than more narrowly conceived articles. If this explanation were accepted, it could be readily understood why articles from the primary classifications appeared so frequently as the lead articles.

None of the books reviewed in the 1909-1911 issues were in the primary classifications. Over ninety percent of the twenty-four books reviewed dealt with either Military History or Professional Information.

1919-1921. By the first year of the next period considered, the Proceedings was being issued on a monthly basis. Accordingly, the period from 1919-1921 had more articles published, two hundred sixty-four, than either of the two earlier periods considered. Five of these articles addressed Foreign Policy, and seventeen related to National Security Policy. The total of these comprised 8.3% of the articles published. This was a relatively small percentage, but it represented a continuation of the increase noted in the second period.

Once again, one lead article in six came from the primary classifications. Since the magazine was now a monthly, a total of six lead articles addressed the primary classifications. As it happened, all of these six articles were concerned with national security policy.

The issue of January, 1919, was the first considered in which there was a review of a book addressing a primary

classification. During the three year period, one book on National Security Policy and two books on Foreign Policy were reviewed. These three books comprised 2.4% of the books reviewed from 1919 to 1921.

Emphasis during the 1919-1921 period, as during the previously considered periods, was on the practical, down-to-earth facts that officers needed to know and understand in order to operate their ships and shoot their guns. This was reflected in the fact that sixty-five percent of the books reviewed contained Professional Information. Another twenty-eight percent were works on Military History.

1929-1931. In this period the percentage of articles on National Security Policy and Foreign Policy again increased. Three hundred eighty articles were presented in the thirty-six issues published during this period. Forty-five (11.9%) of these were from the primary classifications. Thus, for the fourth period analyzed, an increase in the percentage of articles in the primary classifications was noted.

Almost one issue in three featured a lead article from the primary classifications. Eight articles were on National Security Policy; three articles were on Foreign Policy. This was double the rate previously noted.

Attention to the primary classifications increased in book reviews also. Thirteen of the books reviewed (10%)

were devoted to National Security Policy and Foreign Policy.

1939-1941. The years immediately preceding the Second World War saw a continuing growth in the interest shown by naval officers in the primary classifications. The Proceedings for 1939, 1940, and 1941 contained three hundred fifty articles. Forty-four (12.6%) of these had as their subject either Foreign Policy (twenty-four articles) or National Security Policy (twenty articles). Again, as in the years before, a disproportionate number of articles from the primary classifications were featured as lead articles for the magazine. Fifteen of the thirty-six issues (41.7%) had lead articles on National Security Policy (seven articles) or Foreign Policy (eight articles).

Book reviews in the pre-World War II years also reflected the growing interest of naval officers in these areas. From 1939 to 1941, eighteen books (12.2% of those reviewed) dealt with Foreign Policy (eleven books) or National Security Policy (seven books). The curve of interest in each of the primary classifications was thus still rising in each of the methods of measuring used. This indicated a slowly but steadily increasing interest in the officer corps for the subjects of the primary classifications.

1949-1951. Predictably, the massive reorganizations of the late 1940s were reflected in the articles appearing in the Proceedings from 1949 to 1951. Articles addressing

National Security Policy accounted for a full ten percent of the number published. Another 7.7% had to do with Foreign Policy. All told, sixty-two of the three hundred fifty-one articles presented during this three year period fell into the two primary classifications.

The percentage of lead articles dealing with the primary classifications again increased. From 1949 to 1951 exactly one-half of the lead articles were on Foreign Policy (seven articles) or National Security Policy (eleven articles).

Book reviews during this period were strongly oriented toward the large number of histories of World War II that were then appearing; forty-four of the one hundred seventy-seven books reviewed were directed toward World War II. A very small decrease in books addressing the two primary classifications was noted for this period. Twenty-one books (11.9%) having to do with National Security Policy or Foreign Policy were reviewed in the Proceedings in 1949, 1950, and 1951. During the 1939-1941 period, it will be recalled, 12.2% of the books reviewed were concerned with the primary classifications.

Up to this time, books on Professional Information commanded a larger share of the reviewers' attention than did those on any other subject. This applied to every period considered. In the 1949-1951 period, sixty-one (34.5%) of

the books reviewed provided Professional Information.

1959-1961. By the end of 1961 the Defense Department had been tested in the Korean War and had been the subject of two reorganization acts. A wartime five star general had been succeeded as President of the United States by a wartime Navy lieutenant. The methods of government, as well as the style, had undergone numerous changes, ranging from minor stylistic changes to fundamental re-alignment of governmental machinery. The interest of naval officers in Foreign Policy continued to grow in this environment.

More articles on Foreign Policy (fifty-three) appeared in the Proceedings from 1959 to 1961 than on any other subject. Not far behind was the number of articles dealing with National Security Policy, forty-four. The combined total of the two primary classifications accounted for 29.7% of the three hundred twenty-seven articles presented during this three year period.

The trend toward a high percentage of lead articles from the primary classifications continued. Twenty-six articles, almost three-quarters of those presented, dealt with Foreign Policy (nine) or National Security Policy (seventeen).

Although books on Professional Information continued to lead the list of book reviews (28.6%), books in the two primary classifications were given more attention from 1959

to 1961 than in any other period considered. A total of thirty books (15.3%) dealing with the primary classifications were reviewed during this period.

III. CONCLUSIONS

This analysis was drawn from two hundred four individual issues of the Proceedings. A total of one thousand nine hundred three articles and eight hundred five book reviews were examined to develop the figures discussed above. The appendix contains a graphic presentation of the figures developed in this analysis.

From this analysis there appears to be firm evidence to support the conclusion that the interest of naval officers in foreign and national security policy has been steadily increasing since the turn of the century. The percentage of articles dealing with the primary classifications increased steadily and continuingly from less than four percent during the 1899-1901 period to a level of almost thirty percent in the 1959-1961 period. The size of this increase and the steady growth that caused it indicate very strongly that the officer corps has grown increasingly interested in national security and foreign policy.

Additional weight is added to the conclusion above by the analysis of book reviews. During the first six years of issues considered, not one book dealing with a primary

classification was reviewed. However, by the 1959-1961 period, almost one book in six dealt with foreign or national security policy, an average of nearly a book a month.

Recognition of the importance of the primary classifications was indicated in each of the periods studied by the relatively high percentage of lead articles addressing the primary subjects. This factor also showed a meaningful increase, from seventeen percent in the 1909-1911 period to seventy-two percent in the 1959-1961 period.

Analyzing each of the chosen indices illustrates a growing interest on the part of the officer corps in foreign policy and national security policy. Taken in combination, these three factors demonstrate clearly that today's naval officers have a greater degree of interest in, and probably a greater knowledge of, these fields than did any of their predecessors of this century.

CHAPTER V

THE NAVY'S PREPARATION FOR ITS ROLE

"Military advice, as an input to the solution of international problems will only be valid if all the factors which enter into the formulation of national policy have been considered."¹ With these words the President of the United States Naval War College pressed his point in a 1962 letter to the Chief of Naval Personnel. The aim of the letter was to convince the Chief of Naval Personnel to expand the training being given naval officers in the field of international relations. The Navy had already begun a program to train some of its officers in this field; the letter from the President of the War College sought to build on the foundation of the existing program a larger one to meet more effectively and fully the needs of the service and the nation.

The importance attached to this effort by the Navy and the reasoning supporting the Navy's programs in the field are well presented in the War College President's letter:

In summary: Three basic points may be drawn from the above (the basic text of the letter):

¹Enclosure to a letter from the President of the U.S. Naval War College to the Chief of Naval Personnel, dated March 8, 1962, p. 5. On file at the Bureau of Naval Personnel, Washington, D.C.

1. Those matters which most affect the security of our nation are of a political-military nature, neither purely military nor political.

2. These problems cannot be solved to best serve the interest of our country if those who address them are only versed in political or military matters.

3. While the military man must be chiefly competent in military matters, he cannot, in all conscience, be unversed in international affairs. To be so unversed is to be unable to lend that constructive assistance to which the President referred in his address (pertinent portion quoted on page 2, supra). Furthermore, the more the military man understands of the complexities of the problems in the international level, the more able he will be to play on the team with a minimum of friction and a maximum of understanding.

Senior naval officers must be able to interpret and equate international events to properly advise those persons responsible for the development of national policy and to further a sagacious translation of that policy into the manifestations of national power. It is most certainly in the best national interest to insure that such interpretative ability and advice is continually available within the military. The assumption of Free World leadership and the expansion of world-wide commitments involving the military, point to an ever-increasing need for such expertise."²

It was pertinent to this study to examine what steps the Navy had taken and was taking to prepare its officers to fulfill their responsibilities in the formulation of national policy. This was done by addressing (1) the undergraduate education of naval officers, (2) their post-graduate education in both civilian and military schools, (3) the designation system used to identify officers trained in this field, and (4) the opportunities available to officers to further their understanding of the subject by working in the field

²Ibid., p. 6-7.

of policy formulation.

I. UNDERGRADUATE EDUCATION

The Navy's officers come principally from four sources; viz., the U.S. Naval Academy, the Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps, the Officer Candidate School, and in-service promotions from the enlisted ranks. The largest single academic source of officers is the Naval Academy. It will be addressed herein after the other sources have been examined.

The Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps (NROTC) provides training for students at fifty-two of the nation's colleges and universities. The students in the program are commissioned as midshipmen in the Naval Reserve during their time in school. They may pursue almost any course of study they desire--exceptions include art, music, and the ministry. Students are required to take a number of courses in Naval Science to prepare for their duty in the Navy and are required to maintain acceptable academic standards. It can be seen rather readily that this program provides an input to the officer corps of students of several of the academic disciplines. Such academic diversity in the officer corps has proven to be desirable and has provided the Navy a good foundation on which to erect the sub-specialty concept, which is discussed below.

The Officer Candidate School receives most of its students directly from civilian life. These men are required to have a baccalaureate degree, but as in the case of the NROTC the field in which the degree has been earned can come from a large range. Consequently, the Officer Candidate School also provides academic diversity to the make-up of the officer corps.

Promotion from the enlisted ranks to commissioned status does not require a baccalaureate degree. For these officers--and others not holding degrees--the Navy provides a program to encourage earning a degree. After the individual has earned a minimum number of college credits on his own, he is eligible for selection to the five term program, which provides for full time college attendance to permit completing the required work for a degree while in an active duty status. Officers in this program, too, can select the major field of study from a large variety.³

It is apparent from the brief outline above that the only sizeable segment of the Navy's officer corps that has a similar educational background is comprised of graduates of the Naval Academy. Accordingly, an examination of the curriculum at the Naval Academy will provide an insight into the

³Bureau of Naval Personnel, BuPers Instruction 1000.7B (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Naval Personnel, Department of the Navy, 1960), p. 1 of enclosure (2).

undergraduate training given many officers in international affairs and related subjects. It may also prove useful to look very briefly into the philosophy that has underlain the Navy's concept of the role of the Naval Academy.

The Navy has moved more slowly than the Army in introducing the study of international affairs at the undergraduate level. As recently as the years between the world wars, the Navy viewed the Naval Academy principally, and very nearly exclusively, as a training area for preparing a young officer for his first duties at sea. The overly simplified explanation of this concept is to state that the Academy's goal was to train rather than to educate.⁴ This judgment is too harsh and does not give due regard to the academic standards of the Naval Academy and the range of the subjects taught. It does, however, indicate that the Navy expected these officers to gain most of their understanding of international affairs in post-graduate schooling after leaving the Academy.

The curriculum at the Naval Academy has undergone major revision in recent years, and the process does not appear to be over. Though still offering less than the other service academies in the field of international

⁴John W. Masland and Laurence I. Radway, Soldiers and Scholars (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 95.

affairs, the Naval Academy now requires each midshipman to study a foreign language for two years and offers four single semester courses in the field, viz: European history, U.S. diplomatic history, American government, and geography. The diplomatic history course includes a brief analysis of international relations.⁵

A student is often led into an interest in foreign relations because of the interest placed by the Navy on history. Primary emphasis in the history taught in the first year at the NROTC schools and later at the Academy is placed on the Navy and its contributions to the national welfare. The subject is used as a stimulant to the student's interest in naval affairs. A collateral effect is often an awakening of interest in foreign relations.⁶

Morris Janowitz noted that another effect of an Academy education has been the inculcation of a mechanical acceptance by the midshipmen of civilian supremacy over the military. He concluded that officers who develop an interest in international relations do so through higher education or through their own inclinations rather than through the stan-

⁵Ibid., p. 217.

⁶Gene M. Lyons and John W. Masland, Education and Military Leadership (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1959), p. 183.

dard curriculum.⁷

II. POST-GRADUATE EDUCATION

Naval officers receive post-graduate education in both military and civilian institutions. Each of these types of education have been offered to officers for many years, but the emphasis on international relations is relatively recent.

Post-graduate work in military institutions centers on the various war colleges of the nation. The Navy, of course, utilizes the United States Naval War College at Newport, Rhode Island, for the bulk of its officers chosen for war college education.

The U.S. Naval War College is the highest educational institution of the Navy and the oldest institution of its type in the world. It was founded in 1884 and had on its first staff Captain Alfred T. Mahan, who was mentioned in Chapter II, supra. Mahan became the second President of the War College, succeeding Commodore Stephen B. Luce.⁸

In its early years the Naval War College concentrated on fleet tactics and maneuvers--on the realm of combat now

⁷Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1960), p. 138-139.

⁸U.S. Naval War College, Catalog of Courses, 1962-1964, (Newport, Rhode Island: U.S. Naval War College, 1962), p. 2.

categorized as "the battle." Little attention was given to international relations and national policy. While President of the War College, Admiral W.V. Pratt attempted to broaden the scope of the work offered but met with little success. Emphasis continued to be put on tactical procedures and doctrines, pointing toward successful fleet action. Admiral Pratt has been quoted as saying that the Naval War College prepared its students "to fight battles rather than wars."⁹

In 1944 Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox appointed a board to study the Navy's requirements in education for its officers. This group, the Pye Board, submitted its report later in the year and outlined several actions the Navy should take. Although the Board did not recommend breaking abruptly with the past practices of the Navy, it placed its blessing on increased emphasis in the field of international relations. It indicated that such work should remain subordinate to the mastering of purely military subjects.¹⁰ Citing the need for appreciating the relationship between national policy, international policy, and military force, the Pye Board recommended the creation of a College of National Defense that would serve all the services as well

⁹Masland and Radway, op. cit., p. 94.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 149.

as the Departments of State, Commerce, and the Treasury.¹¹
Such an institution came into being with the founding of the National War College in 1946.

The events of the war and the degree to which military officers were confronted with politico-military decisions prompted a re-appraisal of the role to be filled by the war colleges of the nation. The first post-war President of the Naval War College was Admiral Raymond Spruance. This hero of the Pacific campaigns well appreciated the necessity for re-evaluating the content of the course offered at the war college. He rejected a narrow interpretation of the college's role and began the broadening process that was to culminate in a new approach to war college education within the Navy.¹²

It was during Admiral Spruance's administration that the first Foreign Service officer was enrolled as a student at the Naval War College. Subsequently, a Foreign Service officer was appointed to the staff of the war college.¹³ Additionally, representatives from the State Department as well as professional historians and political scientists served as lecturers and guest speakers.

The major change in the curriculum of the Naval War

¹¹Ibid., p. 131.

¹²Ibid., p. 153.

¹³Ibid., p. 154.

College came in 1953. Integral to the change in the curriculum was a change in the role of the war college and the method employed to fulfill that role. The President of the War College in 1953 was Vice Admiral Richard Conolly. Under his direction the course of study was changed from one year to two years. The first year course contained the material previously offered in the strategy and tactics course and in the strategy and logistics course. This course provided a solid basis in naval warfare advanced education for officers in the grades of lieutenant commander and commander.¹⁴

The big innovation was the second year course. This was designed to provide insight into higher level strategy on a national and international level. Students in this course were to be officers in the grades of commander and captain. Content of this course included political, economic, and military aspects of national strategy, the formulation of national policies, foreign area studies, and current international affairs.¹⁵

It should be understood that the introduction of a two year course did not mean that students attended the war college for two consecutive years. Typically, an officer attends the first year of the course then returns to a sea or staff assignment. Later in his career, he may return to

¹⁴Ibid., p. 155

¹⁵Ibid.

Newport for the second year of the course. Furthermore, attendance at the first year course is not a prerequisite for enrollment in the second year course. Thus, an officer may undertake post-graduate work in a civilian institution while a junior officer and then attend the final year of the Naval War College course when he has attained the required seniority.

Before the change of 1953 the Navy's position had been that the Naval War College would prepare officers for naval warfare. The mission of preparing officers for work in the field of high level national strategy was left to the National War College.¹⁶ The move to a two year course reflected a change in this approach. With this change, the Navy offered a similar program in its senior course to those offered by the National War College and the other services' war colleges.¹⁷ This was not viewed as a fundamental change in the role of the Naval War College. The mission remained that of preparing officers for higher command. The change illustrated rather the changing interpretation of the demands of higher command upon the individual officer and provided a basis on which an officer could develop the knowledge and

¹⁶James L. Holloway, Jr., "The Holloway Plan--A Summary View and Commentary," United States Naval Institute Proceedings, 73:1293, November, 1947.

¹⁷Masland and Radway, op. cit., p. 355.

ability necessary to make a meaningful contribution to national policy making.¹⁸

The mission of the senior course at the Naval War College today, as stated by the institution itself, is: "to further an understanding of the fundamentals of warfare, international relations, and inter-service operations, with emphasis on their application to future naval warfare, in order to prepare officers for higher command."¹⁹

It is also stated in the Catalog of the Naval War College that "It is essential for an officer in high command to have a thorough understanding, not only of his own service but also of the other military services and of the inter-relations of the political, economic, socio-psychological and military features of national power and their impact on military strategy."²⁰

To accomplish its aims, the Naval War College devotes a large part of its effort to strategic studies. The major part of the first term is devoted to "international relations, factors influencing United States national objectives and policy, the United States and the Free World, the USSR and

¹⁸Ibid., p. 156

¹⁹U.S. Naval War College, op. cit., p. 6.

²⁰Ibid., p. 10.

the Soviet Bloc, and other strategic areas of interest."²¹

In the second term students participate in a strategic planning study. This part of the curriculum is described by the Naval War College as follows:

By working in student staff organizations, they (the students) first consider the conflicting aims of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., then translate national strategy developed in the fall term into national military strategy, and develop appropriate plans for the implementation of this military strategy under conditions of cold, limited, and general war.

This study culminates in a strategic war game in which the student is able to test the validity of the national strategy developed during the Strategy Study, and the military strategic and plans developed in the Strategic Planning Study. The strategic war game, a two-sided, free maneuver, political-military game of global proportions, is designed to encompass the entire spectrum of conflict including cold, limited, and general war.²²

The Naval Warfare course concludes with the Global Strategy Discussions. These discussions last for one week. Participants include not only all the students of the course but also senior military officers and prominent civilian leaders from all branches of civilian endeavor. Global Strategy Week, as the program is usually called at the War College, began in 1949. Approximately one hundred fifty of the participants come from outside the war college. The civilians invited are the guests of the Secretary of the Navy

²¹U.S. Naval War College, Supplement to Catalog of Courses, 1961-1962 (Newport, Rhode Island: U.S. Naval War College, 1961), p. 2.

²²Ibid., p. 3.

and include well known academicians, industrial leaders, publishers, and other prominent civilians. Representatives of the other services' war colleges also attend.²³

Global Strategy Week includes lectures by authorities in the field, followed by question and answer periods. The participants then divide into groups of fifteen to twenty men each and conduct round table discussions. The results and the conclusions reached by these groups as well as significant issues addressed but unresolved are compared at a plenary session on the final day. The Naval War College believes that "The Global Strategy Discussions are of great mutual benefit to both the civilian and military participants because they point up the mutual dependence of civilian and military thought in the formulation of National Strategy and the factors that affect the formulation of National Strategy."²⁴

Throughout the year, the Naval War College presents a lecture program of visiting speakers to complement the instruction provided by the staff of the war college. Visiting lecturers include senior military and civilian officials as well as distinguished members of the academic community.

In addition to the naval officers in the student body,

²³Masland and Radway, op. cit., p. 237-238.

²⁴U.S. Naval War College, Catalog, p. 19.

the Naval War College also has students from the other military services and from other departments of the government, including the Department of State.

There is yet another course taught at the Naval War College that has considerable but unassessable effect on the education of the naval officer students. This is the Naval Command Course for Senior Foreign Officers. The course, which lasts for one year, has the objective of providing foreign students with a knowledge of command at fleet level and an understanding of naval warfare and weapons and of U.S. concepts for their use. More germane to this paper, however, is the recognition by the war college that the course provides its foreign students "an opportunity to increase their appreciation for the role of sea power in guaranteeing Free World security, and to increase their understanding of international affairs, particularly in the field of politico-military geography, international law, international organizations and defense arrangements, world resources, and the economic aspects of war."²⁵

Most of the foreign students, who come from all over the Free World, bring their families with them to Newport and live in the community. There is a great deal of contact between the U.S. students and the foreign students, both dur-

²⁵Ibid., p. 24.

ing school hours and after. The degree to which this activity "international-izes" the thinking of the U.S. officers cannot be precisely measured; neither can it be denied that such an effect is present.

The Naval War College is not the only higher education military institution utilized by the Navy. Both the Army and the Air Force operate war colleges, and naval officers attend both. Their courses are comparable to the Naval War College in the field of international relations. Predictably, their analyses of warfare tend to concentrate upon combat involving their own service's forces rather than naval forces.

In addition to the service war colleges, there are three institutions of military education that are operated jointly by the services. These are the National War College, the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, and the Armed Forces Staff College.

Joint sponsorship of military education began in June, 1948, with the establishment of the Army-Navy Staff College.²⁶ This school is not the direct predecessor of the present day Armed Forces Staff College, but it did establish the precedent for all joint education. General Henry H. Arnold, then Chief of the Army Air Corps, is credited with initiating action that led to the establishment of the Army-Navy Staff College.

²⁶Masland and Radway, op. cit., p. 103.

General Arnold apparently believed his officers to be poorly informed about the other services and reasoned that the other services' officers were probably equally ill-informed about the nature of air warfare. He therefore proposed that something be done to correct the situation; General Marshall and Admiral King readily agreed. The Army-Navy Staff College was created with a mission to "train officers of all the arms in the exercise of command and the performance of staff duties in unified and coordinated Army and Navy commands."²⁷

In November, 1945, the Army-Navy Staff College was closed, and action began to establish its successor--an institution to present a broader view to a wider audience. Initially, plans had been made for establishing a National Security University, which was to be comprised of separate colleges serving the various departments. This concept was not authorized for implementation, so the military services proceeded with plans for a National War College. The State Department was invited to participate in this college, both on a staff and student basis. The Secretary of State accepted the invitation. The first class convened in August, 1946.²⁸

²⁷The National War College, Academic Year, 1961-1962 (Washington, D.C.: The National War College, 1962), p. 11.

²⁸Ibid., p. 12-13.

In the first years of its existence, the National War College had classes of about one hundred. Occasionally, there were also a few observers from Great Britain or Canada. Presently, the classes number about one hundred thirty-four each. There are no foreign observers. Three-quarters of the students come from the military services. The remaining quarter of the student body is drawn from the Department of State, the Bureau of the Budget, the Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, the U.S. Information Agency, the National Security Agency, and the Department of Commerce.²⁹

The Commandant of the National War College is an officer of the military services of the rank of Vice Admiral or Lieutenant General. He is supported by three deputy commandants. Two of these are military officers (Rear Admiral/Major General); the other, the Deputy Commandant for Foreign Affairs, is a Foreign Service Officer with the rank of Ambassador.

The mission and scope of the college are prescribed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The statement of the mission includes, inter alia: "to enhance the preparation of selected personnel of the armed forces and State Department for the exercise of joint and combined high-level policy,

²⁹Ibid., p. 13.

command and staff functions and for the planning of national strategy."³⁰ Included in the scope of the curriculum is the "study of the integration of military and foreign policy."³¹

In The Role of the Military in American Foreign Policy Sapin and Snyder view the National War College as "further evidence of the Military Establishment's response to its new role in the foreign policy field."³² Masland and Radway note that the National War College devotes more attention to international relations than do the service war colleges.³³

The National War College curriculum is divided into ten courses, as follows:

1. Introduction and World Situation
2. Factors of National Power
3. Formulation of U.S. National Security Policy
4. Strategy and Warfare
5. The Communist States
6. Free Europe and the Western Hemisphere
7. Africa and Free Asia
8. Field Studies; An Appraisal of National Security
9. The Development of National Security Policy
10. The Development of National Strategy, Plans and Programs.³⁴

These courses are taught by several academic proce-

³⁰Ibid., p. 14.

³¹Ibid., p. 15.

³²Burton M. Sapin and Richard C. Snyder, The Role of the Military in American Foreign Policy (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1954), p. 64.

³³Masland and Radway, op. cit., p. 360-361.

³⁴The National War College, op. cit., p. 18.

dures. The student is provided a list of readings in each subject; daily discussion groups are held; student committees are assigned problems and attempt to develop responsive papers and solutions; each student undertakes an individual research paper, which is expected to be of the caliber of a master's thesis. Perhaps the most important single procedure employed is the guest lecturer program. The National War College claims "the most distinguished list of guest lecturers in the nation."³⁵

An examination of the guest lecturers at the school bears out its claim. In a typical year, 1961-62, the guest lecturers included: The Secretary of State, the Service Secretaries, several Assistant Secretaries of Defense, then Senator H.H. Humphrey, Senator Henry M. Jackson, Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Mr. Dean Acheson, Senator Margaret Chase Smith. The academic community of the nation was well represented; lecturers included the following deans and professors: Robert Straus-Hupe, Hardy C. Dillard, George B. Kistiakowsky, Ernest S. Griffith, Arnold C. Wolfers, William Y. Elliott, Edward L. Katzenbach, and Bertram D. Wolfe. A sprinkling of foreign dignitaries also graced the podium of the National War College, lending a truly international air to the students' efforts. The above is representative; it

³⁵Ibid., p. 33.

is neither complete nor does it provide necessarily the most well-known and influential of the guest speakers.³⁶

Following the address of the guest, the floor is opened for questions by the staff and students. All speakers make their remarks off the record, so the students have an unparalleled opportunity to hear explanations of the national policy from the policy makers themselves and their most knowledgeable critics and supporters.

An integral part of the curriculum at the National War College is the field trip taken by the students at the end of the academic year. These trips include visits to foreign nations and often result in the students' meeting and talking with foreign leaders. Field trips in the past have afforded the students the opportunity to meet with Indonesian President Sukarno, Mr. Tom M'boya of Kenya, Prime Minister Nehru of India, and other prominent foreign leaders.³⁷

The splendid education provided by the National War College has been fully recognized by the Navy. Assignment to the National War College is eagerly sought by naval officers. An extraordinarily high percentage of National War College graduates have been selected for flag rank. Of the line officers in the grade of admiral, vice admiral, and rear admiral on active duty on January 1, 1964, one-third

³⁶Ibid., p. 34-39.

³⁷Ibid., p. 44-47.

were graduates of the National War College. Only a slightly larger number of the flag officers (37.4%) were graduates of the Naval War College senior course despite the much larger number of naval officers attending the Naval War College.³⁸

The Industrial College of the Armed Forces is the third senior educational institution utilized by the Navy in preparing its officers for important command, staff, and policy making positions in the national and international security structure. The Industrial College came under the jurisdiction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in May, 1948. The charter issued by the Joint Chiefs to the school four months later placed it on the same level in service education as the National War College and the services' senior schools.³⁹

The scope of studies at the Industrial College includes "orientation in the broad aspects of national and world economic, political, and social conditions and trends. . . . study and analysis of the structure and operations of the Department of Defense. . . . study of the organization and processes for determining total requirements for national

³⁸Bureau of Naval Personnel, Register of Commissioned and Warrant Officers of the United States Navy and Marine Corps and Reserve Officers on Active Duty, 1 January 1964 (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Naval Personnel, Department of the Navy, 1964), p. x, 1-3.

³⁹Masland and Radway, op. cit., p. 162.

security."⁴⁰ As this excerpt from the general information booklet of the college indicates, the curriculum covers much of the same material as does that of the National War College. Superficially, the similarities are great. A closer examination reveals, however, that the two schools have quite a different approach to educating their student bodies. For purposes of comparison, it may be stated that the National War College produces a military strategist with a political background while the Industrial College's graduate is a military strategist with an economics background. This comparison is overly simplified, but it describes in broad terms the basic difference between the schools.

Students at the Industrial College devote the majority of their time to subjects such as management principles and concepts, materiel management, economic capabilities, and human and natural resources.⁴¹ The curriculum is definitely related to foreign policy and international relations but not so directly as is that of the National War College.

The teaching methods and procedures of the two schools are similar. At the Industrial College, like the National

⁴⁰Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Curriculum and General Information, 1962-1965 (Washington, D.C.: Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 1962), p. 3.

⁴¹Ibid., p. 6-10.

War College, committees are used extensively to study problems; lectures and seminars are supplemented by field trips and guest speakers; and each student delivers an oral presentation to the entire class and writes a thesis.

The graduates of the Industrial College have not been as successful in attaining flag rank as have the graduates of the National War College. Nevertheless, thirteen graduates were wearing admiral's stars in 1964, accounting for six percent of the line admirals in the Navy.⁴²

The junior member of the triad of joint service schools under the jurisdiction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the Armed Forces Staff College at Norfolk, Virginia. This school has a student body comprised for the most part of officers in the grade of lieutenant commander or major. The school teaches the principles of staff work and prepares officers for assignment to major staffs. Most of the time at the school is spent in mastering the procedures for preparing military plans.

There is, however, a segment of the course at the Armed Forces Staff College that serves to prepare an officer for participation in the policy making process. This section of the curriculum constitutes about one-sixth of the school's instructional time and "provides an opportunity for study of unresolved issues and future prospects, including those pro-

⁴²Bureau of Naval Personnel, Register, p. x, 1-3.

duced by new politico-military arrangements."⁴³ The final fifteen hours of summary discussion at the school emphasize the interdependence of political and military factors.

A less widely used but important aspect of officer training for international security policy making is the practice of sending U.S. officers to foreign service schools. This exchange of students has been most frequent between the United States and Great Britain. A sizeable number of American officers have attended the Imperial Defence College and, indeed, one admiral is a graduate. Two U.S. Navy admirals are graduates of the Canadian National Defence College. Other naval officers have attended the United Kingdom Joint Services Staff College, the NATO Defense College, the Spanish Naval War College, the German General Staff College, the Royal Air Force Staff College, the French Naval War College, and the Royal Naval Staff College.⁴⁴ It appears obvious that an American officer graduating from any of these colleges will return home with a keener appreciation of foreign problems and affairs and will be better equipped to contribute to his own nation's foreign policy making.

Comparison of the present curriculum at the service colleges with those of twenty-five years ago reveals that

⁴³Masland and Radway, op. cit., p. 313.

⁴⁴Bureau of Naval Personnel, Register, p. x, 1-3.

much greater attention is being paid to foreign policy and international relations. This fact receives further emphasis from the large amount of politico-military material in the curricula of the joint colleges. From this situation an interesting issue arises. Have the military schools overreached in their efforts to prepare officers for participation in the policy making process? The military apparently does not believe so. Morris Janowitz notes:

There is no concern (among military educators) that the new type of education might contribute to fashioning a generation of highly political colonels who will be ill at ease with the traditions of civilian political control. On the contrary, the informal curriculum of the three service war colleges is geared to the notion that the professional soldier must be fully equipped to present vigorously to the public and to opinion leaders--in and out of government--his service's point of view on budget matters and on military policy.⁴⁵

It appears that the issue raised by Janowitz answers itself. If, as is now the case, the advice and counsel of military leaders is needed in the formulation of the nation's foreign policy, then these leaders must be informed. Their range of knowledge cannot be limited to the purely military aspects of the problem. Broad and detailed knowledge on the firing rate of weapons, the speed and capacity of ships, and the rate of climb of aircraft have little direct application in matters of national security policy. If the military leader's advice is to be meaningful, he must be knowledgeable

⁴⁵Janowitz, op. cit., p. 144.

to some extent of the background behind the questions he is asked. He must understand the workings of the national policy structure, the goals of the nation's foreign policy, and the primary obstacles to achieving them. Only in this way can he provide adequate, usable military advice. As yet, there is no indication that the "new type of education" is producing a generation of highly political colonels or captains. If such indications should arise, then the problem must be addressed--but the answer to the problem cannot be an effort to keep the military leaders ignorant of international affairs.

In common with the other services--and to a somewhat greater degree than they--the Navy has relied on civilian universities as a training ground for its officers. Naval officers were not a rarity on civilian campuses prior to World War II. Today, there are more officers than ever working on a full or part time basis for an advanced degree from a civilian institution.

A large number of the officers so employed are assigned to post-graduate by the service. While attending school, such officers are on active duty receiving full pay and allowances. The bulk of their school expenses are borne by the Navy.

Compared to the other disciplines, the study of political science and international relations by naval officers

had a late start. Admiral Robert Carney, while Chief of Naval Operations, declared in 1953 that there was an urgent need for greater knowledge of international affairs within the Navy.⁴⁶ The first reaction to this growing belief in the Navy was the inclusion in the curriculum of the Navy's General Line School of a brief treatment of the present role of the United States in world affairs and the functions of the Departments of State and Defense.⁴⁷ This was followed by the initiation of the political science post-graduate education program in civilian universities.

Two Navy commanders were assigned to the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy in 1956 to pursue a study of political science.⁴⁸ This marked the beginning of what has become one of the most sought-after programs in the Navy's post-graduate education program. After completing the two year program of study, these two officers reported for duty in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and were assigned to the Politico-Military Division. Such an assignment is considered highly desirable, and the developing career patterns of these two officers made a further contribution to the high level of interest in this program.

The course offered at the Fletcher School was for two

⁴⁶Masland and Radway, op. cit., p. 154.

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 280.

⁴⁸Ibid., p. 304.

years. The second class, which contained three officers, began the course of study in 1957. The following year a naval officer was sent for post-graduate political science work to Stanford University; at the same time, two more officers were ordered to the Fletcher School. This two year program, labelled the "Political Science PG" by the Navy, has continued at both of these schools.⁴⁹

The success of the two year program and the increasingly recognized need for officers trained in this field led to the establishment of an additional program in 1960. This new program, the International Relations PG, provided selected officers a one year course of study at The American University or at Harvard University. Ten officers were selected for this program in 1960. In the years since then, the number of officers in the program has increased. The University of California at Berkeley became a participating institution in this program in 1961. Officers assigned to this program spend one year in post-graduate work and upon successful completion of the course receive a master's degree. The keen interest of the officer corps in this program and the intense competition for selection for it are highlighted by the fact that less than five percent of the officers eligible for the program on

⁴⁹Obtained from study of various letters, memoranda, records, and files in the Bureau of Naval Personnel, Washington, D.C. This footnote also applies to the two succeeding paragraphs.

the basis of rank and academic background can be selected because of numerical limitations.

The success of the graduates of these programs in major staff assignments and the relatively late start the Navy made in this field dictated a need for short-range stop-gap action in the early nineteen-sixties. At that time, Navy captains, who are rarely selected for civilian post-graduate schooling, were chosen to attend the one year course. The plans of the Bureau of Naval Personnel were to continue this procedure until a supply of trained officers of appropriate seniority had been developed.

As a follow-on action to the two programs just discussed, the Navy instituted a smaller program that provided for officers to continue post-graduate work in these fields. The aim of these students would be to earn the doctor's degree. The Navy's purpose in developing this program was to provide a small number of officers with a deeper understanding of international relations. The obvious inference to be drawn is that such officers would be assigned to major staff billets requiring a sound background in international relations.

The growth of these programs in a short time is demonstrated by comparing the enrollment figures for 1956, 1962, and 1963. In 1956 only two naval officers were enrolled in post-graduate courses in political science and international

relations. These two commanders comprised merely a fraction of one percent of the naval officers in advanced education programs that year. By 1962 the figure had grown to thirty-five officers, comprising approximately three and one-half percent of the naval officers receiving advanced education and about twelve percent of those in civilian institutions. The following year the number of naval officers in the programs had increased to fifty-nine and accounted for four percent of the officers receiving advanced education. In that year, 1962, one of every six naval officers ordered to a civilian institution for advanced work was a participant in one of the programs discussed herein.

By paying a portion of the costs, the Navy has also encouraged officers to continue advanced education outside the formal, Navy-sponsored post-graduate program. The Tuition Aid Program of the Navy provides that personnel pursuing work leading to a graduate degree may receive financial assistance from the service. The graduate degree must be in one of the following fields: education, engineering, international relations, management, mass communications, mathematics, or physical science. If the applicant meets very basic requirements, the service will pay three-quarters of the tuition cost.⁵⁰

⁵⁰ Bureau of Naval Personnel, BuPers Instruction

Through the Tuition Aid Program, numerous Navy men have advanced their levels of education. Personnel are actively encouraged to enroll in courses when duty assignments permit. The Washington, D.C., area provides an excellent example of this program in action. The demand for both undergraduate and graduate level classes has been so great among military personnel that evening classes are regularly conducted in the Pentagon.

By yet another means does the Navy provide education to its widely-dispersed members--correspondence courses. This teaching and testing method has enjoyed wide usage in the Navy. Enlisted and officer training courses are provided by the Naval Correspondence School. At one time officers were required to complete successfully a prescribed series of courses or face rigorous written examinations in qualifying for promotion.

The type of course of primary interest, however, is provided by the U.S. Naval War College. Seven graduate level courses are offered by the school; four of these are directly applicable to the Navy's efforts to prepare its officers for roles in the making of national policy. Examinations are not given to students taking the extension courses nor are grades

assigned. The solutions proposed by the students are evaluated individually as acceptable or unacceptable. The latter are returned for resubmission.

The extension courses offered by the Naval War College of interest here include National and International Security Organization, Strategic Planning, International Law, and International Relations. Reading courses in International Law and International Relations are available in addition to the extension courses.⁵¹

The Bureau of Naval Personnel distributes annually to all ships and stations a list of books and articles recommended for reading. The list is prepared by the staff of the Naval War College. This service permits officers whose assignments place them outside the mainstream of policy matters to keep abreast of developments. In this way, upon their return to staff assignments, the officers who have kept up with current thinking and problems will have less ground to make up as they strive to contribute to policy making.

The interruptions that sea duty impose on officers' participation in policy making (and, indeed, many officers would view this in reverse) make it necessary that there be a method for officers to keep aware of national and inter-

⁵¹U.S. Naval War College, Catalog, p. 27-32.

national developments. In addition to the availability of the news media, the Bureau of Personnel reading list fills a real need.

Every ship and station in the Navy has a library. Some of these are, of course, quite small; others are on a par with a small public library; a few are quite large. A ship's library receives a quarterly supplement of books from the Bureau of Naval Personnel. These books are selected to meet the requirements of the widely disparate tastes of a ship's library's users. There are always at least a few books in each quarterly shipment that deal with international relations or national policy making in some way. Judicious attention to the receipt of new books enables many officers on sea duty to broaden their knowledge in these fields.

III. DESIGNATION OF OFFICERS

Through all of the measures discussed above, the Navy has obtained or developed a sizeable number of officers with a working knowledge of international relations, foreign policy, national security policy, and political science. Figures available in the files of the Bureau of Naval Personnel in 1962 showed that the Navy's officer corps contained officers with the levels of education shown in Table I on the next page.

TABLE I

THE EDUCATION LEVEL OF U.S. NAVAL OFFICERS IN
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE

Degree held	International Relations	Political Science
Bachelor's	291*	1,261**
Master's	55	37
Doctor's	3	0
Totals	349	1,298

Notes: *Eighteen of these officers have at least fifteen hours credit in their work toward a master's degree.

**Thirty-seven of these officers have at least fifteen hours credit in their work toward a master's degree.

In an organization as large as the Navy and faced with the wide range of requirements the Navy has, a system is required to insure that officers trained in a given field are assigned to billets utilizing their knowledge. Similarly, it is necessary to identify billets that require officers with special training and skills. This problem is complicated for the Navy because the primary specialty of every line officer must be command at sea. Expecting an officer to master even minimally the demands of a wide range of disciplines in addition to his primary responsibility is recognized by the Navy as unrealistic. According, the Navy has introduced the sub-specialty concept in recent years. This concept is designed to cope with this problem.

In essence, the sub-specialty concept provides that

officers retain as primary in their training, education, and efforts the goal of increasing their ability to command forces at sea. This priority applies to all unrestricted line officers. An officer may also develop a sub-specialty, and various avenues are open to officers attempting to do so. The most frequently used path leading to designation as a sub-specialist is post-graduate education followed by assignment to a billet in which that training is used.

When an officer has achieved sufficient knowledge and experience in the field of his sub-specialty, his personnel record will indicate that he is qualified in that sub-specialty. Typically, a graduate degree and a tour of duty in a related billet are required before an officer is considered qualified as a sub-specialist.

One of the sub-specialities used by the Navy is "International Affairs Officer." According to the Manual of Naval Officer Billet Classification, an officer with this sub-specialty "advises and assists in planning and implementation of policy with respect to naval aspects of international affairs; provides background information and studies in international developments relating to the Navy; serves as Navy representative in foreign surveys and projects; . . . maintains liaison with other branches of the armed services and with civil agencies of government con-

cerned with international affairs."⁵²

IV. DESIGNATION OF DUTY ASSIGNMENTS

As already mentioned, the billets requiring a sub-specialist are also identified. A board in the Bureau of Naval Personnel determines which billets require such identification. Their decisions are based on recommendations from the parent organizations of the billets. The following excerpt from a letter from the Chief of Naval Operations illustrates the procedure while at the same time addressing the importance of training in international relations to the Politico-Military Division of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations:

The experience of this division (Politico-Military) has indicated that such training (post-graduate study in international relations) is imperative in order to provide the Chief of Naval Operations with adequate staff support in the increasingly demanding area of international relations.⁵³

In response to this letter five billets in the division were identified as requiring sub-specialists.⁵⁴ Subsequently,

⁵²Bureau of Naval Personnel, Manual of Naval Officer Billet Classifications (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Naval Personnel, Department of the Navy, 1954).

⁵³Letter from Chief of Naval Operations to Chief of Naval Personnel, OP614/djb, Ser 1557P61, 7 February 1961, on file in the Bureau of Naval Personnel.

⁵⁴Internal BuPers Memorandum, Pers A321 to Pers A114, on file in the Bureau of Naval Personnel.

three additional billets in the division were also so designated.⁵⁵

Throughout the Navy, a great deal of training is done on-the-job. This is true, of course, in policy making billets as in any others. An officer assigned to a billet that requires him to make contributions to policy will surely leave the billet wiser and more experienced than he was on his arrival. This fact should be borne in mind when considering the next chapter. Throughout the process of contributing to policy formulation, naval officers are individually gaining a greater amount of related knowledge and expertise. Morris Janowitz notes that in 1950 almost one senior naval officer in four had been assigned to such a billet at some point during his career.⁵⁶

V. SUMMARY

In sum, no single method or system is used by the Navy to train its officers in international relations. There is no "school solution." A combination of undergraduate, graduate, service college, joint college, and foreign service war college education is blended with experience and buttressed

⁵⁵Internal OPNAV Memorandum, OP-09B21 Memo of 14 June 1961, on file in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.

⁵⁶Janowitz, op. cit., p. 167.

with reading courses, correspondence courses, and recommended readings to provide naval officers with an understanding of international relations and foreign policy. In concert these methods have produced naval officers with sufficiently broad understanding of the field to permit them to contribute meaningfully to policy formulation.

CHAPTER VI

PRESENT NAVY PARTICIPATION

IN POLICY MAKING

In the years since World War II, naval officers have continued to make solid contributions to the policy making process. Admiral Leahy served as chief-of-staff (his own term) to the President for some time after the war; there can be little doubt that he provided advice and guidance to policy makers at the highest level. Two naval officers have served as the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. Although this is not a policy making agency, its daily briefings to the chief executive provide a forum for directing attention to areas of interest.

After retiring from active duty, Admiral Alan G. Kirk twice served as an ambassador.¹ Admiral George Anderson retired as the Chief of Naval Operations in 1964 and immediately accepted appointment as the United States Ambassador to Portugal.

I. EXAMPLES OF NAVY PARTICIPATION

In addition to the individuals mentioned above, there

¹Hanson Baldwin, "The Military Move In," Harper's Magazine, 195:482, December, 1947.

have been numerous events since World War II in which the Navy's contribution to foreign policy can be seen--or at least surmised. One of the problems associated with a study of this subject is that a great deal--in fact, a majority--of illustrative examples of the Navy's contributions cannot be divulged because of security classifications and requirements. The role of the Navy in such instances must be surmised or determined on the basis of reports from presumably informed sources.

Hanson Baldwin reports that the policy of the United States regarding the former Japanese mandated islands was definitely the product of military influence.² Sapin and Snyder are even more specific, stating that the Navy Department was a "vigorous and strong-willed participant in the intragovernmental negotiations" regarding the disposition of those islands held by Japan on mandate from the League of Nations.

It has also been pointed out by Mr. Baldwin that military strength was a requirement for implementing both the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. It can, therefore, be inferred that military influence in policy making

²Ibid.

³Burton M. Sapin and Richard C. Snyder, The Role of the Military in American Foreign Policy (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1954), p. 33.

have been numerous events since World War II in which the Navy's contribution to foreign policy can be seen--or at least surmised. One of the problems associated with a study of this subject is that a great deal--in fact, a majority--of illustrative examples of the Navy's contributions cannot be divulged because of security classifications and requirements. The role of the Navy in such instances must be surmised or determined on the basis of reports from presumably informed sources.

Hanson Baldwin reports that the policy of the United States regarding the former Japanese mandated islands was definitely the product of military influence.² Sapin and Snyder are even more specific, stating that the Navy Department was a "vigorous and strong-willed participant in the intragovernmental negotiations" regarding the disposition of those islands held by Japan on mandate from the League of Nations.

It has also been pointed out by Mr. Baldwin that military strength was a requirement for implementing both the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. It can, therefore, be inferred that military influence in policy making

²Ibid.

³Burton M. Sapin and Richard C. Snyder, The Role of the Military in American Foreign Policy (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1954), p. 33.

helped to shape these policies.⁴

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is not purely a military pact, but during the early years of its life it functioned primarily as such. Daniel S. Cheever and H. Field Javiland Jr. report that a delegation of American Army, Navy, and Air Force officers, headed by Major General Lyman Lemnitzer (later Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and subsequently Allied Commander in Europe) was sent to Europe to study the problem of re-building a credible defense in NATO Europe.⁵ The conclusions of these officers had considerable impact on American foreign policy, especially in the field of military assistance and foreign aid. Edgar S. Furniss, Jr. points out the magnitude of the Military Assistance Program, and the inescapable interweaving of aid policy and foreign policy emerges from his analysis.⁶

Following the Korean War, direct diplomatic negotiations for ending the fighting were conducted between representatives of North Korea and the United Nations. The delegation of the United Nations was comprised entirely of mili-

⁴Baldwin, op. cit., p. 483.

⁵Daniel S. Cheever and H. Field Haviland, Jr., American Foreign Policy and the Separation of Powers (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1952), p. 126.

⁶Edgar S. Furniss, Jr., Some Perspectives on American Military Assistance, Memorandum Number Thirteen (Princeton, N.J.: Center of International Studies, 1957), p. 2.

tary men; all but one were Americans.⁷ Admiral Turner Joy of the United States Navy played a prominent role in this international parlay.

In July, 1951, Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, Chief of Naval Operations, began exploratory discussions with the Spanish government regarding bases in Spain for American forces. This was the beginning of a major change in policy toward Spain. In 1952 negotiations began between the two nations, conducted in large part by the United States military mission. In September, 1953, an agreement was signed by the United States and Spain, giving the United States base rights to certain air and naval bases in Spain in exchange for a substantial amount of military and economic aid.⁸ This agreement marked a dramatic change in direction for United States policy. Many sources, including Sapin and Snyder, credit the impact of military influences with effecting this change.⁹

These examples should serve to illustrate that military men, specifically naval officers, have continued since World War II to make contributions to the formulation of foreign policy. In this chapter an effort will be made to determine how such contributions are made--through which

⁷Sapin and Snyder, op. cit., p. 50.

⁸Ibid., p. 23.

⁹Ibid.

channels? by which naval officers? to whom?

II. THE NAVAL OFFICERS INVOLVED

At some point in his service, virtually every professional officer has an opportunity to contribute to the policy making process. This contribution may be made directly, in the form of a staff solution to a problem, or indirectly, in the form of influence exerted on a present or future policy maker.

In most instances the key to an officer's opportunity for contributing to policy is the organization and billet to which he is assigned. Some billets obviously are totally removed from the realm of policy making; others are directly in the mainstream. Typically, the more senior an officer becomes, the greater is the likelihood that he will be a part of the policy making apparatus. Supporting this contention are these statements by Morris Janowitz, "While every military task ultimately impinges on international politics, some officers have tasks which involve direct political planning and political negotiation" and "Every ranking field officer stationed abroad is, by virtue of his very position, a political agent."¹⁰

¹⁰Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier (Glencoe, Ill: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1960), p. 70.

A survey conducted by John W. Masland and Laurence I. Radway indicated that approximately seventeen percent of all admirals were assigned to interservice or international agencies or to other departments of the federal government. In the grade of captain about eleven of the officers were serving in such assignments.¹¹ Janowitz, noting these results, points out that "As warfare becomes more technological, the number of military command assignments decreases while 'military management' and politico-military assignments increase."¹²

Among the numerous channels through which naval officers make an input to foreign policy formulation, the Department of Defense is the most prominent. It is clearly recognized in the Defense Department and in the individual services that the Department of State has primary responsibility for making foreign policy. It is equally well recognized that policy makers need military advice. And, on occasion, foreign policy must be so oriented as to make its primary objective the securing of military or naval advantages for the nation. In such instances military advice becomes all the more important. It is probably accurate to assume that

¹¹John W. Masland and Laurence I. Radway, Soldiers and Scholars (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 516.

¹²Janowitz, loc. cit.

in some instances the requirements of the military establish the goals of policy. Accordingly, the position of the Department of Defense on foreign policy matters has a significant impact on the policy developed.

III. THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

The most powerful policy maker in the Defense Department is, of course, the Secretary of Defense. In the years before Secretary McNamara took office, such a statement would have been open to discussion and probably dispute. The Secretary of Defense has always had a strong voice, but so did the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Chiefs themselves. They still do, but there is no question that Secretary McNamara's position is most likely to be the prevailing one if differences of opinion exist within the Department.¹³

¹³It is interesting to note the evaluation made by Morris Janowitz in The Professional Soldier, p. 355-356, in considering the pre-McNamara situation: "The type of civilians appointed in recent years to the top levels of the military establishment tends to define their task as a form of industrial management. They are only reluctantly drawn into the implications of the political dimensions of day-to-day military operations. . . . Professional officers have thus come to carry the burden of administering the politico-military responsibilities of the armed forces." Even if this view was accurate in 1960, which is debatable, it no longer applies accurately to the Department of Defense. The Department is not so monolithic that contributions to policy cannot be made without going through the Secretary of Defense. They can be and they are, but such contributions are exceptions to the rule.

IV. THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

Most of the Secretary's staff support in the field of politico-military affairs comes from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (OASD/ISA). This organization is the evolved product of a special consultant on politico-military matters appointed by the Secretary of Defense in 1949. The status of that office was increased by a Presidential directive in 1950; and, later, as a result of the reorganization of 1953, the post of Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs was created.¹⁴

The responsibilities of this office are far-ranging. It has been referred to as the Little State Department of the Pentagon. Indeed, most of the problems addressed in this office are also studied by State Department officers; a great deal of cooperation and coordination between State and OASD/ISA is required and apparently exists.

In the early years of its existence, OASD/ISA focused primarily on the foreign military assistance program and

¹⁴Arthur W. MacMahon, Administration in Foreign Affairs (University, Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1953), p. 180-181; and

Brookings Institute, The Administration of Foreign Affairs and Overseas Operations (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 1951), p. 123.

policies relating thereto. The post of Director of Military Assistance was created to provide staff support to the Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs. Initially the post was filled by an officer of four star rank, Army General Williston B. Palmer, who had sufficient rank and seniority to deal directly with the Joint Chiefs of Staff for OASD/ISA. Subsequently, the post has been filled by a three star officer; the present director is Vice Admiral Luther C. Heinz, United States Navy.

Staff support for the Director of Military Assistance includes active duty naval officers. These men make a direct contribution to national policy in their recommendations concerning the military assistance program. The military assistance program is a tool for achieving foreign policy objectives; at the same time, its use and its limits establish some of the boundaries within which policy objectives must be developed.

Serving under the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs are seven civilian deputy assistant secretaries. Their offices focus on the following areas: European and NATO Affairs; Far Eastern Affairs; Africa, Latin America, and Foreign Military Rights; Near Eastern and Southern Asian Affairs and Military Assistance Program Policy Review; Arms Control and Foreign Economic

Affairs; and International Logistics Negotiations.¹⁵ These officials are supported by a staff of approximately forty-five senior military officers and a number of civilian experts.¹⁶

The requirement for this large organization is apparent when the responsibilities of the OASD/ISA are considered. This office helps the Secretary of Defense formulate the department's position on United Nation affairs, National Security Council actions, inter-governmental negotiations, and similar politico-military matters.¹⁷ Indeed, many of the positions of the Defense Department on highly important issues are determined by this office and implemented without specific reference to the Secretary.¹⁸

The other Assistant Secretaries of Defense have naval officers on their staffs. To the degree that the other Assistant Secretaries are brought into the policy making process, the naval officers in their organizations have an opportunity to contribute to the formulation of policy. In the main, however, the greatest contributions by naval officers in the

¹⁵Department of Defense, Telephone Directory (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966), p. C-8.

¹⁶Masland and Radway, op. cit., p. 514.

¹⁷Sapin and Snyder, op. cit., p. 26.

¹⁸Paul Y. Hammond, Organizing For Defense (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1961), p. 253.

Office of the Secretary of Defense are made by those serving in the Office of the Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs.

V. THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

The most influential military officer in the field of policy formulation is the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This officer commands none of the services directly but acts precisely as his title indicates--as Chairman of the corporate body known as the Joint Chiefs of Staff. His position gives him considerable influence as well as access to the highest levels in the national government.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff can be a member of any of the services. To date, one Navy officer, one Air Force officer, and four Army generals have filled the position. The Chairman regularly attends meetings of the National Security Council and frequently testifies before the Congress. His position, responsibilities, and military expertise combine to make him an influential force in the formulation of foreign policy.

VI. THE JOINT STAFF

Staff support for the Chairman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff comes from the Joint Staff and the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The distinction between the Joint

Staff and the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is primarily an administrative one. The statutory numerical limitation on the Joint Staff has resulted in part of the staff support for the Joint Chiefs being assigned to the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff rather than to the Joint Staff. Their missions are basically the same, viz: providing staff support to the Chairman and the Joint Chiefs.

The Joint Staff is organized into directorates for personnel, operations, logistics, plans and policy, and communications.¹⁹ Any of these directorates might be involved in policy making on a given problem, but the bulk of problems dealing with politico-military matters are handled by the J-5, the directorate for plans and policy. This directorate, like all the Joint Staff and Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is manned by representatives of all the services. Naval officers and marines fill approximately one-third of all billets in each directorate and agency. Action officers in the Joint Staff are typically of commander or captain rank; division directors and agency chiefs are flag or general officers as are the directors of the Joint Staff directorates.

It may be informative to trace a typical problem through the staffing process in the Joint Staff in order to illustrate the procedure through which decisions are made by

¹⁹Department of Defense, op. cit., p. C-9, C-10.

the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The problem requiring a decision may come from a number of sources. In this example it is assumed that the Secretary of State has requested from the Secretary of Defense the position of the Defense Department on a matter with politico-military implications. The Secretary of Defense, in turn, refers the problem to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their recommendations. (The Secretary may, at the same time, refer the problem for study and recommendation to a part of his own staff, e.g., OASD/ISA.) Within the Joint Staff the problem will be referred to one of the directorates for development of a recommended Joint Chiefs position. Other interested directorates are invited to comment on the proposed position developed by the action officer. The position is then submitted to the service staffs for comment or concurrence. Finally, it is addressed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff themselves and the decision is sent to the Secretary of Defense.²⁰

This illustration highlights the importance and influence of the action officer. He drafts the first paper proposing a position for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Although his position is subject to modification by the service planners, his seniors in the Joint Staff, and the Joint Chiefs themselves, he has the advantage of proposing the

²⁰Masland and Radway, op. cit., p. 514-515.

first solution. Those in disagreement with his solution are then forced to propose a better one. Because of the volume of problems facing the Joint Chiefs and service planners, action officers are often more fully acquainted with the details of specific problems than anyone else. They can, therefore, present a strong case for accepting their proposed solutions. Their seniors usually possess a better grasp of all the broad range of problems confronting the nation and can insure that the proposed position is compatible with the overall national interest.

The Special Assistant for Military Assistance Affairs serves as a part of the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This flag or general officer is supported by staff officers from each of the services. Liaison between this office and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs is required to insure the fullest benefit for the national interest from the Military Assistance Program.

Another part of the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that plays a part in the policy forming process is the Joint War Games Agency (JWGA). The Politico-Military Division of this agency has been a pioneer in conducting large scale politico-military games. As pointed out by Lincoln P. Bloomfield, the primary advantage of politico-

military gaming is the education afforded the participants.²¹ Military and civilian personnel taking part in the elaborate games of the JWGA have an excellent opportunity to gain new insights into politico-military problems. These insights can then be applied as they grapple with problems in the "real world."

VII. THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Even more than the Joint Staff, the Joint Chiefs themselves are involved in the policy making process. Their positions as heads of the individual services provide their pronouncements with considerable influence--whether made jointly or individually. The stature of the Joint Chiefs is well recognized in foreign nations as well as in the United States. "Though not engaging in formal diplomatic negotiations, members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other high-ranking military officers have had increasing opportunities in recent years to talk to leading political as well as military figures in other countries. . . . Visiting members of the Joint Chiefs seem to go through the same round of conferences and conversations in some countries as important Senators and Congressmen."²²

²¹Lincoln P. Bloomfield, "Political Gaming," United States Naval Institute Proceedings, 86:57, September, 1960.

²²Sapin and Snyder, op. cit., p. 49.

VIII. THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

As the Navy's member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chief of Naval Operations occupies an important position in the machinery for making national policy. The necessity for allowing the Chief of Naval Operations adequate time to prepare himself for these responsibilities was recognized in the reorganization of 1958. This authorized the delegation of certain tasks and authority to the vice chief of the service, thereby permitting the chief of the service to prepare more fully and participate more actively in the policy making process.

Staff support for the Chief of Naval Operations comes from the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, which is commonly abbreviated OPNAV. Divisions form the fundamental organizational elements of OPNAV. Two of the divisions are especially active in advising the Chief of Naval Operations on matters relating to international affairs and politico-military matters.

The first of these divisions is the Strategic Plans Division (OP-60). One of the components of OP-60 is the national policy section. This group of officers deals with highly classified matters relating to national security and are instrumental in developing the Navy's position on complex problems in the field of international affairs.

The Politico-Military Division (OP-61) has the primary function of advising the Chief of Naval Operations on day-to-day events in international political affairs with emphasis on those relating to the Navy.²³ It should be emphasized that the title of this division relates only to international politics; domestic politics are not addressed. OP-61 is organized on a basis of geographic responsibility. Staff officers work on problems from a given geographic area, much like the desk officers at the State Department.

The officers assigned to OP-61 are usually graduates of the National War College or a senior service college.²⁴ Additionally, many of the graduates of the Navy's post-graduate education program in international relations are subsequently assigned to this division.²⁵

Other divisions throughout OPNAV are often involved in problems with international politico-military implications. Prominent among these divisions are the Foreign Military Assistance Division, the Pan-American Affairs Division, and the Office of Naval Intelligence. Staff officers in each of

²³John McAuley, "The Navy's Role in International Affairs," United States Naval Institute Proceedings, 77:16, January, 1951. See also Masland and Radway, op. cit., p. 515; and, Sapin and Snyder, op. cit., p. 26.

²⁴McAuley, loc. cit.

²⁵This observation and several others that follow in this chapter are based on personal knowledge of the author.

these divisions have occasion to make contributions in determining the position of the Chief of Naval Operations on problems relating to international affairs.

This brief description of the workings of the Joint Staff and the Navy Staff should not lead to the conclusion that all of the work done by the staff officers involves reacting to problems posed by others. The Chief of Naval Operations can and does propose subjects for discussion by the Joint Chiefs of Staffs and recommends courses of action relating to them. Therefore, a staff officer on the Navy Staff can propose to the Chief of Naval Operations a course of action in an international situation. If the Chief of Naval Operations agrees with the proposal, it can be brought to the attention of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. With their concurrence the proposal can be sent to the Secretary of Defense and thence onward and upward in the policy making machinery. An intelligent, aggressive staff officer has the opportunity to make substantive contributions to the nation's foreign policy.

IX. UNIFIED AND INTERNATIONAL COMMANDERS

Each of the unified commanders is supported by a joint staff. There are, of course, naval officers on each of these staffs. To the degree that the unified commander is involved in the policy making process his staff officers have an

opportunity to contribute to the formulation of policy. The amount of influence exerted by a unified commander in the policy making process is affected by many things. There can be little doubt that Admiral U.S.G. Sharp, the U.S. Navy officer heading the Pacific Command, has some voice in the determination of national policy in Southeast Asia. The degree to which his recommendations are followed is not known publicly at this time because of security restrictions. Nevertheless, it seems safe to assume that both Admiral Sharp and his staff officers are making a contribution, of undetermined magnitude, to the national policy.

The same opportunity, in greater or lesser degree, is available to each of the unified commanders and the officers of his staff. In this regard, the Commander-in-Chief of the Atlantic Command (Admiral Thomas Moorer, U.S. Navy) and the United States Commander-in-Chief of the European Command (General Lyman Lemnitzer, U.S. Army) have additional opportunities to influence international affairs. Each of these officers serves not only as the commander of a U.S. command but also as a Supreme Allied Commander in NATO. In their NATO assignments these officers head combined staffs, manned by officers from all the NATO nations. Their influence on policy in the treaty organization can only be inferred since security restrictions again deny public access to the records. It appears, however, that these commanders and their staffs,

which include U.S. Navy officers, must exert some influence on the policies of NATO. As Sapin and Snyder note, NATO's central headquarters "is constantly engaged in what must be called international military planning."²⁶

There are other international organizations in which U.S. naval officers find an opportunity to contribute to the furtherance of U.S. policy. In some instances, the officers also have a hand in developing the policy they are charged with implementing. Examples of these organizations include the Inter American Defense Board, the Canadian-U.S. Planning Group, the bodies consulting on defense matters concerning the United States and Brazil and the United States and Mexico, the Southeast Treaty Organization, and, in an observer status, the Central Treaty Organization.

There is also a military staff committee included in the United States delegation to the United Nations. This group is headed by an officer of three star rank. A naval officer has held this post in the past, and other naval officers have served on the staff.²⁷

Still more naval officers are assigned to duty as naval attaches in U.S. embassies around the world. These officers are charged with advising the U.S. Ambassador on

²⁶Sapin and Snyder, op. cit., p. 9.

²⁷Brookings Institute, op. cit., p. 132.

naval matters relating to the host nation and the United States. Navy members of the staffs of Military Assistance Advisory Groups and Missions also contribute to the policy making machinery by the reports they submit to Washington.

X. INTERAGENCY ACTIVITIES AND OPINION MOLDING

When the President chooses to use the National Security Council as a primary organ for policy making, the Defense Department is represented by the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As described earlier, the positions and policies advocated by these men have often been developed by their staffs, which include naval officers. MacMahon sees military participation in the National Security Council as an "acknowledgment by the armed forces of the paramount nature of the political factors and at the same time a bid to participate in political decisions."²⁸

The Department of State itself has two Navy captains assigned to it as action officers. In return, two Foreign Service officers fill action officer billets in OPNAV, usually in OP-60 and OP-61. This program provides for cross-pollination of ideas in addition to giving each organization the benefit of the knowledge of officers from another department.

²⁸MacMahon, op. cit., p. 47.

The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, as well as OP-61 to a lesser degree, maintains close liaison with the State Department. This permits each department to be aware of and, perhaps, to influence the policy decisions of the other.

Naval officers have opportunities to contribute directly to policy making at the highest executive level. The President is briefed and advised by the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and, on occasion, the Chief of Naval Operations. Once more, these officials must rely on their staffs for thorough study of major problems. And, once more, naval officers are assigned to the staff of each of them.

In the legislative branch the influence of the Navy on policy making is less continuous. During the annual budget hearings, the Chief of Naval Operations testifies before Congressional committees. His statements and responses to their questions can often be useful to members of Congress when faced with policy decisions.

In this regard, Sapin and Snyder note that "One of the noteworthy aspects of the processes that characterize recent American foreign policy decision-making is the use of members of the Defense Establishment, both top civilian officials and the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other high-ranking military officers, to testify in support of new foreign policy and

programs and the continuance of ongoing ones before committees of Congress."²⁹

There is another large area in which naval officers exert influence on and make contributions to national policy. This area cannot be even approximately measured, but its potential is large. The area is that encompassed by the effect of naval officers and their views on the nation's opinion molders and policy makers. This effect exists, even though it cannot be measured, in several places.

For example, naval officers at government educational centers, such as the National War College, influence their civilian colleagues to some degree. In the same way the non-Navy students at the Naval War College may be influenced in their opinions by naval officers as may those attending the seminars on policy making conducted by the State Department. Naval officers attend both the State Department's four month seminar and its twelve month seminar for senior officials.

Inter-departmental working groups, such as the State-Defense Study Group, provide another arena in which the opinions of naval officers can influence and be influenced by their fellow members of the study group. In all such inter-department and inter-agency groups the potential for advising, informing, and influencing the other members of the group

²⁹ Sapin and Snyder, op. cit., p. 46.

exists. It should be pointed out that the exertion of influence on the opinions of other members of such groups or committees is rarely done with a premeditated, ulterior motive. It is, rather, a predictable, reasonable, and probably desirable result of officials from different departments working together on a common problem.

Opinion molders, policy makers, and the public in general may be affected in their convictions regarding international affairs by speeches they hear. A surprisingly large number of requests are received by the Navy Department for speakers at various events. Because of the number of requests received, a sizeable number of speeches are made annually by senior officers of the Navy. These speeches, and the conversations that precede and follow them, provide a large number of people with a better understanding of the Navy's capabilities, problems, and prospects. Since a part of the Navy's work deals directly with international relations, some of the speeches address this topic.

It would be unfair to say that the activities of the Navy League in advocating specific national policies are examples of the Navy's influence in policy making. The Navy League is a civilian organization, entirely separate from the service. On the other hand, in view of the mission of the Navy League, it would be naive to assume that the policies advocated by that body are contrary to the Navy's interests.

XI. SUMMARY

In summary, although there is no naval officer with a direct, statutory responsibility for formulating national foreign policy, a large number of naval officers have a direct or, more frequently, indirect effect on the national policies. Sapin and Snyder summarized the situation well: "The essential development to be stressed in discussing military participation in the formulation of American foreign policy is that the Military Establishment has become a partner, a very important partner, of the State Department and other relevant civilian agencies in these policy making activities."³⁰

³⁰Ibid., p. 34.

CHAPTER VII

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

Few subjects are designed to make the task of a researcher an easy one. This paper provided examples of some of the problems a researcher can face. In the first place, most of the material with which this paper deals is classified as security information. Accordingly, a researcher preparing an unclassified paper must often skirt the fringes of a central issue because he cannot obtain access to or use of pertinent information.

Sapin and Snyder discussed another problem relating to research of this subject, "Unfortunately, there is not much detailed case material available from which could be derived reasonably clear notions as to the nature of military influence on policy substance: that is, those situations and those problems in which the values of the military, their objectives, estimates of the situation and analyses of policy alternatives, have tended to prove dominant."¹

National policy is developed in several ways, ranging from a well structured, organizational position to an agreement between government officials made quickly during a cri-

¹Burton M. Sapin and Richard C. Snyder, The Role of the Military in American Foreign Policy (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1954), p. 32.

sis without detailed staff study and support. Because of this, it is not always possible to determine the genesis of a policy and the factors that influenced its development.

Even with these limitations, however, one can reach conclusions regarding the role of the Navy in the development of foreign policy and national security policy.

The change in the nature of the international society and the degree of American participation in it have created a greater requirement for military strength and for the consideration of military factors in foreign policy. Accordingly, it is reasonable to expect that the military sector of the government would have greater contributions to make to the policy formulation process. This appears to be the case.

Changes that have caused this situation include the objectives of our policy and the nature of the threat facing the nation. Although national security was the foundation on which policy was built for many years, it has now become the goal toward which policy is directed. This means that military measures have achieved a relatively greater priority than before since they are now directed toward preserving the existence of the republic rather than merely advancing interests that are not vital for survival.

The threat facing the nation is different from any in our history. The advocates of the communist ideology have

at their disposal the means to initiate conflicts covering the spectrum of conflict from an all-out massive nuclear Armageddon through the so-called "wars of national liberation" to diplomatic and economic pressures. This multifaceted threat has required that the United States possess stronger and more flexible military forces than ever before. To be effective, the use of these military forces must be closely coordinated with the other actions of the government. This has resulted in the military sector of the government becoming more interested and involved in the actions of the other parts of the government--and vice versa.

A logical outgrowth of the greater involvement of the military can be seen in the number of military officers now assigned to other agencies of the government. U.S. military officers are now assigned to the State Department, the Atomic Energy Commission, the Central Intelligence Agency, and other governmental departments and agencies.

Changes in the nature of threat to the nation and in the objectives of the national policy have also been reflected in the organizational structures of the services themselves. Beginning in the nineteen-forties, the staff of the Chief of Naval Operations has included a Politico-Military Division to inform, advise, and support the Navy's senior officers.

The type and locations of its operations and responsi-

bilities have always dictated that the Navy be aware of and responsive to the demands of national policy. In recent years it has been necessary that this awareness be even more closely attuned with that of other segments of the government, that the Navy's responsiveness be even more closely geared to the requirements of policy, and that the Navy understand even better the factors influencing the policies it may be called upon to implement. An obvious corollary is that it has become more and more desirable that policy makers know very accurately how naval power can be used to advance the national interest--in both peace and war.

Contributing to the development of foreign policy is not a totally new role for the Navy, but the channels through which the contributions are made have changed remarkably in recent years.

Before the twentieth century, naval officers in foreign areas were often required both to formulate and then to implement the national policy, guided by their own understanding of the national interest and very broad directives from the national government. Thus, Commodore Matthew C. Perry forced negotiations upon the Japanese, negotiations that have had a major effect on international relations ever since.

As the ability of the government to communicate rapidly with its distant officers improved, the necessity for on-the-spot policy making declined. Accordingly, the Navy's

contributions to policy making began to come from officers at or near the seat of power. The work of Admiral A.T. Mahan must be recognized as an example of the Navy's contributions to policy making and an important influence on American policy at the turn of the century.

The shift toward the seat of government as the primary site of naval officers' contributions to policy was completed during the years of World War II. At the same time, the degree of Navy participation in formulating the national policy reached its zenith. Considering President Roosevelt's practice of relying on his military leaders for advice and counsel together with the fact that his military "chief of staff" was a naval officer, Admiral W.D. Leahy, it can be assumed that the Navy's contributions to policy were significant even though the policies advocated and accepted cannot be determined specifically in all cases. Roosevelt's failure to seek and accept the positions of the State Department during this period increased the relative strength of the policy proposals of the military leaders.

Following the death of President Roosevelt and the end of World War II, the procedures for formulating national policy underwent major changes. The work of Admiral Arthur W. Radford and his contributions to policy making while the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff can be viewed as a carry-over from the years of individual contributions to

policy, for the years following World War II saw policy making become a function of organizations more and more, of individuals less and less.

The National Security Act of 1947 established a formal, organizational structure for the formulation of national policy. The place of the Navy in this structure was clear. The Secretary of the Navy, as well as the Secretary of Defense, served as a statutory member of the National Security Council. The Chief of Naval Operations had a major voice as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a voice not yet muted by the appointment of a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.

With the enactment of the National Security Act of 1947, the contributions made by the Navy to the formulation of national policy changed from primarily individual efforts to organizational efforts. Policy became increasingly the product of organization representatives working together in the National Security Council and subordinate groups. Direct and undiluted contributions by individuals comprised a much smaller part of the nation's policy making.

In the years since 1947 the importance of the Navy Department itself has diminished while the importance of the Defense Department has increased. The Secretary of the Navy, no longer a member of the National Security Council, and the Chief of Naval Operations, now subordinate to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, now appear to have less influence

on the national policy than they did in the past. Acting through the Department of Defense, however, they may now have more influence than before. This comparison is subject to so many variables and unknown factors that a precise evaluation is impossible. It is concluded here only that most of the Navy's present contribution to national policy making is channeled through the Department of Defense.

Reorganizations of the Defense Department in 1949, 1953, and 1958 have had impacts on the amount and method of the Navy's work in formulating policy. The Congressional authorization of a Joint Staff, and the subsequent increases in its size, have tended to lessen the authority and influence of the Navy staff. However, since approximately one-third of the officers of the Joint Staff are naval officers, the overall result of the creation of the Joint Staff on the Navy's role in policy making cannot be determined. In the first place, it is virtually impossible to determine how much the Joint Staff contributes to policy making. Even if this could be done, the degree of Navy participation and influence in developing a specific position is never made public because of security restrictions and probably could not be ascertained even without security restrictions.

Because the military now has a channel through which all the services can speak with one voice, i.e. the Chairman and the Joint Staff, the net result of unification may have

been an increase in the military's role in policy making. Within this structure, however, it is impossible to isolate fully the role of an individual service.

Within the Navy there has been an increasing amount of attention and interest given to the subject of international relations and national security policy. In the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings the number of articles, lead articles, and book reviews addressing the subject has increased steadily since the turn of the century. The subject is now one of those most discussed and studied by naval officers throughout the country and around the world.

The expenditures made by the Navy to prepare its officers for work in this field are large in terms of money and manpower. A sizeable portion of the curriculum at the U.S. Naval War College is devoted to international relations and national security policy. Naval officers attending the other senior service colleges receive similar instruction. Correspondence courses are provided by the Navy in these subjects and are widely used by officers in the fleet and ashore. A significant part of the Navy's post-graduate program in civilian universities is devoted to the study of international relations and political science.

It is good that this much effort is made to prepare naval officers because a large number of them are assigned to billets in which they are involved, either directly or

indirectly, in policy making on a national and international scale. A Chief Petty Officer assigned to the Politico-Military Division of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations made a realistic evaluation of the Navy's role in policy making in 1951. There have been many changes since then, but Chief McAuley's remarks still describe well the way a service position can influence policy making:

We are all aware that the Navy does not make foreign policy. Foreign policy emanates from the National Security Council, over which the President presides, and the Department of State. But before a recommended policy or action reaches the level necessary for approval, it is accompanied by many so-called "slants" submitted by various other departments and agencies concerned with the subject. These slants may range from complete disapproval to a recommendation for minor textual changes. It is through the medium of these slants that each department and agency, including the Navy Department, is afforded the opportunity of interjecting its opinions and influence in the formulation of U.S. foreign policy.²

The Navy's contributions to policy making today are made largely through staff procedures, where action officers strive to produce a position both responsive to the problem and realistic to the circumstances. By the time a proposed policy has been examined at several levels and by representatives of several departments, it is to be expected that its weaknesses and inconsistencies will have been discovered and eliminated.

²John McAuley, "The Navy's Role in International Affairs," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, 77:16, January, 1951.

The issue of whether or not the military should take part in policy making has been answered affirmatively in a study by the prestigious Brookings Institute, which concludes:

The Department of Defense should participate in the formulation of foreign policy by furnishing military advice to the President and the Department of State, taking economic and foreign policy implications into account, so far as feasible in developing its military advice.³

In general terms this appears to be the present practice. Since 1945 there has been a continuing and successful effort to make more effective the national policy making machinery. The Navy has been an important part of this effort and an important contributor to the process of formulating the national policy. In view of the troubled international situation and the role of the United States as the pre-eminent power in the Free World, it is probable that the Navy's role in formulating national policy will not lessen in the years ahead.

It is appropriate that this final quote should have been written by a naval officer. In a letter to Congressman Clifton A. Woodrum, Chairman of the Committee on Postwar Military Policy, Fleet Admiral William F. Halsey, United

³Brookings Institute, The Administration of Foreign Affairs and Overseas Operations (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 1951), p. xvii.

States Navy, said:

I have one more point to offer: the need for wise, trained men to minister the National Policy. We need men who understand the fundamentals of our aims and ideals, who understand the interrelation of international politics, internal politics, trade and finance, and the true significance of military power. . . . We must find and train such men--outstanding civilians who have served their country under arms and outstanding military men who have studied to understand the civil aspects of government and international relations. If we don't find and train and employ such men in the service of the United States, we will lost our shirts as we have in the past--and then what avails the sacrifice of life, blood, and treasure that we have made?⁴

⁴Letter from W.F. Halsey to C.A. Woodrum, in Walter Millis (ed.), The Forrestal Diaries (New York: The Viking Press, 1951), p. 62.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

A. PRIMARY SOURCES

1. Public Law

United States Congress. National Security Act of 1947.
Public Law 253 of the 80th Congress, July 27, 1947,
61 Stat. 495.

2. Publications of the Government

Department of Defense. News Release Number 50-61. Address
by Admiral Burke before the Distinguished Service Awards
Banquet, Houston, Texas, January 21, 1961.

_____. News Release Number 369-61. Address by Admiral
Burke before the Kansas Bar Association, Wichita, Kansas,
April 20, 1961.

_____. News Release Number 464-61. Address by Admiral
Burke in Salt Lake City, Utah, May 17, 1961.

_____. News Release Number 700-61. Address by Admiral
Burke before the American Management Association, Saranac
Lake, N.Y., July 11, 1961.

_____. Telephone Directory. Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1966.

Department of the Navy, Bureau of Naval Personnel. Line
Officer Personnel Newsletter. VI, July, 1962.

_____. Manual of Naval Officer Billet Classification.
Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Naval Personnel, Department
of the Navy, 1954.

_____. "Programs and opportunities available to Navy person-
nel," BUPERS Instruction 1000.7B, September 20, 1960.

_____. Register of Commissioned and Warrant Officers of the
United States Navy and Marine Corps and Reserve Officers
on Active Duty, 1 January 1964. Washington, D.C.: Bureau
of Naval Personnel, Department of the Navy, 1964.

_____. "Tuition Aid," BUPERS Instruction 1560.10C, March
26, 1962.

Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Information.
Navy Speakers' Notes Number 2-61a. Address by Admiral A.
 A. Burke before the Freedoms Foundation Banquet, Phila-
 delphia, Pennsylvania, February 13, 1961.

_____. Navy Speakers' Notes Number 4-61. Address by Hon.
 John B. Connally, Secretary of the Navy, before the Wash-
 ington Area Navy and Marine Corps Officers, April 11,
 1961.

_____. Navy Speakers' Notes Number 8-61. Address by
 Admiral J.H. Sides at the commissioning of the USS IWC
 JIMA (LPH 2), Bremerton, Washington, August 26, 1961.

_____. Navy Speakers' Notes Number 1-62. Address by
 General D.M. Shoup before the Defense Orientation Con-
 ference Association, Washington, D.C., September 28,
 1961.

_____. Navy Speakers' Notes Number 4-62. Address by Hon.
 Fred Korth, Secretary of the Navy, at the commissioning
 of the USS SAM HOUSTON (SSB(N) 609), Newport News, Vir-
 ginia, March 6, 1962.

_____. Navy Speakers' Notes Number 5-62. Address by Vice
 Admiral C.D. Griffin before the National Security Commis-
 sion and Committees of the American Legion, Washington,
 D.C., February 28, 1962.

_____. Navy Speakers' Notes Number 7-62a. Address by Rear
 Admiral John Quinn before the Kiwanis Club of Baltimore,
 Baltimore, Maryland, May 24, 1962.

Industrial College of the Armed Forces. Curriculum and
General Information 1962-1963. Washington, D.C.: Indus-
 trial College of the Armed Forces, 1962.

Joint Chiefs of Staff Special Committee for Reorganization of
 National Defense. Report, JCS 3/1. Washington, D.C.:
 Joint Chiefs of Staff, April, 1945.

National War College. Academic Year 1961-1962. Washington,
 D.C.: National War College, 1962.

Organisation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. "Organization
 Chart." Washington, D.C.: The Joint Chiefs of Staff,
 August 15, 1962.

United States Congress. . Congressional Record, 75th Congress, 3rd Session. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1938.

United States Naval War College. Catalog of Courses 1962-1964. Newport, Rhode Island: United States Naval War College, 1962.

_____. Supplement to Catalog of Courses, 1961-1962. Newport, Rhode Island: United States Naval War College, 1961.

United States Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery. Organizing For National Security. 3 vols. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1961.

3. Periodicals

United States Naval Institute. Proceedings. 21 volumes, as follows: Vol. 25-27, 35-37, 45-47, 55-57, 65-67, 75-77, and 85-87. Dated, respectively, as follows: 1899-1901, 1909-1911, 1919-1921, 1929-1931, 1939-1941, 1949-1951, and 1959-1961.

4. Unpublished Material

Department of the Navy, Bureau of Naval Personnel. "Visit to Naval War College relative to final arrangements for the NWC-GWU program." Memorandum for the Record, May 22, 1962. On file in the Bureau of Naval Personnel.

_____. "Billet Coding." Internal BuPers Memorandum from Pers A321 to Pers A114, March 15, 1961. On file in the Bureau of Naval Personnel.

Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. "Billet Coding Request." Internal OPNAV Memorandum, OP-09B21 Memo of 14 January 1961. On file in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.

United States Naval War College. "The Desirability for Naval Officers to Have a Background in International Relations." Memorandum enclosure to a letter from the President of the United States Naval War College to the Chief of Naval Personnel, March 8, 1962. On file in the Bureau of Naval Personnel.

B. SECONDARY SOURCES

1. Publications of the Government

Department of the Navy. Review of Management of the Department of the Navy, NAVEXOS P-2426A. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1962.

Department of the Navy, Office of Information. "Statement of Secretary of Defense before the Senate Committee on Armed Services," CHINFO Notice 5721. Washington, D.C.: Department of the Navy, September 14, 1963.

National War College and Industrial College of the Armed Forces. "Public Policy and Military Responsibility," an address by Senator J.W. Fulbright to opening session of the Colleges. Washington, D.C.: Press release by National War College and Industrial College of the Armed Forces, August 21, 1961.

Office of the Secretary of Defense. "Secretary Forrestal Announces Result of Key West Conference," Press Release #38-48. Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, March 26, 1948.

2. Books

Beard, Charles A. American Foreign Policy In The Making. A Study In Responsibilities. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1946.

Bradley, General Omar N. A Soldier's Story. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1951.

Brookings Institute. The Administration of Foreign Affairs and Overseas Operations. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 1951.

Cheever, Daniel S. and H. Field Haviland, Jr. American Foreign Policy and the Separation of Powers. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1952.

Clark, George R., William O. Stevens, Carroll S. Alden, and Herman F. Krafft. A Short History of the United States Navy. Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1939.

- Corwin, E.S. The President: Office and Powers, 1787-1948. New York: New York University Press, 1948.
- DeConde, Alexander (ed.). Isolation and Security. Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1957.
- Einstein, Albert, et al. The Militarization of America. Washington, D.C.: National Council Against Conscription, 1948.
- Ekirch, Arthur A. Jr. The Civilian and the Military. New York: Oxford University Press, 1956.
- Hammond, Paul Y. Organizing For Defense. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1961.
- Hart, B.H. Liddell. The German Generals Talk. New York: Berkley Publishing Corporation, 1958.
- Herring, Pendleton. The Impact of War. New York: Farrar & Rinehart, Inc., 1941.
- Howard, Michael (ed.). Soldiers and Governments. Nine Studies in Civil-Military Relations. Bloomington, Ind: Indiana University Press, 1959.
- Hull, Cordell. The Memoirs of Cordell Hull. 2 vols. New York: The MacMillan Company, 1948.
- Huntington, Samuel P. The Common Defense. Strategic Programs in National Politics. New York: Columbia University Press, 1961.
- _____. The Soldier and The State. Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957.
- Huntington, Samuel P. (ed.). Changing Patterns of Military Politics. Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962.
- Janowitz, Morris. The Professional Soldier. Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1960.
- Kaufmann, William W. (ed.). Military Policy and National Security. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1956.
- Kintner, William R. Forging A New Sword. New York: Harper & Brothers, Publishers, 1958.

- Leahy, Fleet Admiral William D. I Was There. New York: Whittlesey House, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1950.
- Legere, Lawrence J., Jr. Unification of the Armed Forces. Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1952.
- Lyons, Gene M. and John W. Masland. Education and Military Leadership. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1959.
- MacMahon, Arthur W. Administration in Foreign Affairs. University, Ala.: University of Alabama Press, 1953.
- Masland, John W. and Laurence I. Radway. Soldiers and Scholars. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1957.
- Millis, Walter. The Constitution and the Common Defense. New York: The Fund for the Republic, 1959.
- Millis, Walter (ed.). The Forrestal Diaries. New York: The Viking Press, 1951.
- Millis, Walter, et. al. Arms and the State, Civil-Military Elements in National Policy. New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1958.
- Neblett, William H. Pentagon Politics. New York: Pageant Press, 1953.
- Palmer, Brigadier Williston B. The Evolution of Military Policy in the United States. Washington, D.C.: Book Department, Army Information Center, 1946.
- Rockefeller Brothers Fund. The Mid-Century Challenge to U.S. Foreign Policy. Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1959.
- Sapin, Burton M. and Richard C. Snyder. The Role of the Military in American Foreign Policy. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1954.
- Smith, Louis. American Democracy and Military Power. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1951.
- Stanley, Timothy W. American Defense and National Security. Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1956.

Stimson, Henry L. and McGeorge Bundy. On Active Service In Peace and War. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1948.

Vagts, Alfred. Defense and Diplomacy. The Soldier and the Conduct of Foreign Relations. New York: King's Crown Press, 1956.

Whitaker, Arthur P. Spain and Defense of the West. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1961.

3. Periodicals

Baldwin, Hanson. "The Military Move In," Harper's Magazine, CXCV (December, 1947).

Bigley, Commander Thomas J. "The Office of International Security Affairs," United States Naval Institute Proceedings, XCII (April, 1966).

Bloomfield, Lincoln P. "Political Gaming," United States Naval Institute Proceedings, LXXXVI (September, 1960).

Brannen, Captain Phillip Barry. "A Single Service: Perennial Issue In National Defense," United States Naval Institute Proceedings, LXXXIII (December, 1957).

Burke, Admiral Arleigh A. "The JCS In Operation," United States Naval Institute Proceedings, LXXXIII (March, 1957).

Colbert, Rear Admiral Richard G. and Colonel Robert N. Ginsburgh. "The Policy Planning Council," United States Naval Institute Proceedings, XCII (April, 1966).

Department of State. Foreign Affairs Manual Circular. No. 46A, January 25, 1962.

Eastman, Ford. "Broader Planning Role Seen For Defense," Aviation Week, LXXIV (June 2, 1961).

Fox, William T.R. "Civilians, Soldiers, and American Military Policy," World Politics, VII (April, 1955).

Hammond, Paul Y. "Decision-Making in Defense: The Role of Organization. Effects of Structure on Policy," Public Administrative Review, XVIII (Summer, 1958).

- Holloway, Rear Admiral James L. Jr. "The Holloway Plan--A Summary View and Commentary," United States Naval Institute, LXXIII (November, 1947).
- "How Does McNamara Do It?", Nation, September 30, 1961.
- "How Kennedy Plans To Run Defense and Foreign Policy," U.S. News and World Report, L (January 9, 1961).
- Howard, Michael. "Civil-Military Relations in Great Britain and the United States, 1945-1958," Political Science Quarterly, LXXV (March, 1960).
- Huddle, Frank P. "Army-Navy Consolidation," editorial, Research Reports, II (October 6, 1945).
- Huntington, Samuel P. "Interservice Competition and the Political Roles of the Armed Services," American Political Science Review, L (March, 1961).
- Kampelman, Max M. "Decision-Making in Defense: The Role of Organization. Congressional Control vs. Executive Flexibility," Public Administration Review, XVIII (Summer, 1958).
- Kintner, Colonel William R. "Progress in Defense Organization," Journal of Public Law, IX (Spring, 1960).
- Kissinger, Henry A. "Strategy and Organization," Foreign Affairs, XXXV (April, 1957).
- Lawrence, David. "An Impossible Job," U.S. News and World Report, XLVII (December 14, 1961).
- Lyons, Gene M. "The New Civil-Military Relations," American Political Science Review, L (March, 1961).
- Masland, John W. "The National War College and the Administration of Foreign Affairs," Public Administration Review, XII (Autumn, 1952).
- McAuley, John. "The Navy's Role in International Affairs," United States Naval Institute Proceedings, LXXVII (January, 1951).
- "McNamara in Control: A Firm Hand At Pentagon," U.S. News and World Report, LI (October 2, 1961).

Millis, Walter. "The Puzzle of the Military Mind," The New York Times Magazine, November 18, 1962.

Mosher, Frederick C. "Decision-Making in Defense: The Role of Organization. Old Concepts and New Problems," Public Administration Review, XVIII (Summer, 1958).

New York Times, March 15, 1959.

Orem, Vice Admiral Howard E. "Shell We Junk the JCS?" United States Naval Institute Proceedings, LXXXIV (February, 1958).

Radford, Admiral Arthur W. "We Give Military Advice Only," U.S. News and World Report, XLI (February 25, 1955).

Radway, Laurence I. "Decision-Making in Defense: The Role of Organization. Uniforms and Mufti: What Place in Policy?" Public Administration Review, XVIII (Summer, 1958).

Rochester, Lieutenant H.A. "The Navy's Support of Foreign Policy," United States Naval Institute Proceedings, LVII (November, 1951).

Souers, Admiral Sidney W. "Policy Formulation for National Security," American Political Science Review, XLIII, (June, 1949).

Stillman, Richard J. "The Pentagon's Whiz Kids," United States Naval Institute Proceedings, XCII (April, 1966).

Twining, General Nathan F. "The JCS," Ordnance, XLIII, (May-June, 1959).

Waters, Lieutenant Colonel Ace L. Jr. and Lieutenant Colonel Jack L. Rogers. "The Re-Organization of the Department of Defense," Armor, LXVIII (January-February, 1959).

White, General Thomas D. "The Military Voice is Dangerously Weak," Newsweek, LX (December 31, 1962).

4. Research Memoranda

Furniss, Edgar S. Jr. "Some Perspectives on American Military Assistance. Memorandum Number Thirteen." Princeton University: Center of International Studies, June 18, 1957.

Sapin, Burton M., Richard C. Snyder, and H.W. Bruck. "An Appropriate Role for the Military in American Foreign Policy-Making: A Research Noted." Princeton University: Organizational Behaviour Section, 1954.

5. Unpublished Material

Janowitz, Morris. "Working Paper on the Professional Soldier and Political Power," Bureau of Government, Institute of Public Administration, University of Michigan, July, 1953. (Mimeographed)

Lee, Richard M. and Marshall E. Sanders, "The Impact of American Foreign Policy On The Changing Relationships Between Military and Civilian Groups," prepared under the supervision of Edgar S. Furniss, Jr. and Richard C. Snyder, Princeton University, spring term, 1951. (Mimeographed)

Legere, Lawrence J., Jr. "Unification of the Armed Forces," Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Harvard University, 1950.

APPENDIX

TABLE II

ANALYSIS OF CONTENT OF ALL ARTICLES IN UNITED STATES NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS

Subject of the Articles	1899-		1909-		1919-		1929-		1939-		1949-		1959-		T
	Number/ Percent	1901	Number/ Percent	1911	Number/ Percent	1921	Number/ Percent	1931	Number/ Percent	1941	Number/ Percent	1951	Number/ Percent	1961	O
Foreign Policy	1	1.3%	4	2.6%	5	1.9%	24	6.3%	24	6.9%	27	7.7%	53	16.2%	138
National Security Policy	2	2.6%	4	2.6%	17	6.4%	21	5.5%	20	5.7%	35	10.0%	44	13.5%	143
Administration and Personnel	10	13.2%	35	22.6%	53	20.1%	78	20.5%	68	19.4%	56	16.0%	35	10.7%	335
Equipment and Technology	24	31.6%	59	38.1%	109	41.3%	134	35.3%	66	18.9%	66	18.8%	52	15.9%	510
Operations	21	27.7%	17	11.0%	27	10.2%	33	8.7%	41	11.7%	35	10.0%	40	12.2%	214
United States History	15	19.7%	25	16.1%	28	10.6%	58	15.3%	77	22.0%	64	18.2%	41	12.5%	308
Modern Foreign History	3	4.0%	3	1.9%	11	4.2%	19	5.0%	31	8.9%	42	12.0%	26	8.0%	135
Non-modern Foreign History	0	0%	4	2.6%	4	1.5%	8	2.1%	19	5.4%	11	3.1%	11	3.4%	57
Foreign Navies Appraisals	0	0%	4	2.6%	0	0%	3	0.8%	4	1.1%	8	2.3%	13	4.0%	32
Leadership	0	0%	0	0%	10	3.8%	2	0.5%	0	0%	7	2.0%	12	3.7%	31
Total Articles	76		155		264		380		350		351		527		1903




FIGURE 1

PERCENT OF ALL ARTICLES PUBLISHED IN THE
U.S. NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS ON
NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY
AND FOREIGN POLICY

TABLE III

ANALYSIS OF CONTENT OF LEAD ARTICLES IN UNITED STATES NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS

Subject of the Article	1899-	1909-	1919-	1929-	1939-	1949-	1959	1961	T
	Number/ Percent	Number/ Percent	Number/ Percent	Number/ Percent	Number/ Percent	Number/ Percent	Number/ Percent	Number/ Percent	O T A I.
Foreign Policy	-	-	-	3	8	7	9	25.0%	27
National Security Policy	-	-	6	8	7	11	17	47.2%	51
Administration and Personnel	2	16.7%	9	22.2%	19.5%	3	2	5.6%	27
Equipment and Technology	3	16.7%	6	8.3%	5.6%	4	1	2.8%	21
Operations	6	25.0%	3	5.6%	5.6%	4	6	16.7%	34
United States History	1	8.3%	5	16.7%	22.2%	3	-	-	20
Modern Foreign History	-	-	4	22.2%	8.3%	4	-	-	16
Non-modern Foreign History	-	-	-	13.9%	8.3%	11.1%	-	-	4
Leadership	-	-	3	11.1%	8.3%	-	-	-	4
Total Articles	12	12	36	36	36	36	36	36	204




FIGURE 2

PERCENT OF LEAD ARTICLES PUBLISHED IN THE
U.S. NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS ON
NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY
AND FOREIGN POLICY

TABLE IV

ANALYSIS OF SUBJECT OF BOOKS REVIEWED IN UNITED STATES NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS

Subject of Books Reviewed	1899- 1901	1909- 1911	1919- 1921	1929- 1931	1939- 1941	1949- 1951	1959- 1961	T O
	Number/ Percent	Number/ Percent	Number/ Percent	Number/ Percent	Number/ Percent	Number/ Percent	Number/ Percent	
Foreign Policy	0 0	0 0	2 1.6%	8 6.2%	11 7.5%	18 10.2%	7 3.6%	46
National	0	0	1	5	7	3	23	39
Security Policy	0	0	0.8%	3.8%	4.8%	1.7%	11.7%	
Military	3	9	34	46	37	30	50	209
History	33.3%	37.5%	27.9%	35.4%	25.2%	17.0%	25.5%	
Non-military	0	1	3	22	8	9	14	57
History	0	4.2%	2.5%	16.9%	5.4%	5.1%	7.2%	
Peacetime	0	1	3	2	16	12	18	52
Operations	0	4.2%	2.5%	1.5%	10.9%	6.8%	9.2%	
Professional	6	13	79	47	66	61	56	328
Information	66.7%	54.2%	64.8%	36.2%	44.9%	34.5%	28.6%	
World	-	-	-	-	2	44	28	74
War II	-	-	-	-	1.4%	24.9%	14.3%	
Totals	9	24	122	130	147	177	196	805




FIGURE 3

PERCENT OF BOOK REVIEWS PUBLISHED IN THE
U.S. NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS ON
NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY
AND FOREIGN POLICY

thesK466

The role of the Navy in the formulation



3 2768 002 10891 2

DUDLEY KNOX LIBRARY